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Abstract
We study auction design in the standard symmetric independent private values environment,
where the seller lacks the commitment power to withhold an unsold object off the market. The
seller has a single object and can conduct an infinite sequence of standard auctions with reserve
prices to maximize her expected profit. In each period, the seller can commit to a reserve price
for the current period but cannot commit to future reserve prices. We analyze the problem with
limited commitment through an auxiliary mechanism design problem with full commitment, in
which an additional constraint reflects the sequential rationality of the seller. We characterize
the maximal profit achievable in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the limit as the period
length vanishes. The static full commitment profit is not achievable but the seller can always
guarantee the profit of an efficient auction. If the number of buyers exceeds a cutoff which is
small for many distributions, the efficient auction is optimal. Otherwise, the efficient auction
is not optimal, and we give conditions under which the optimal solution consists of an initial
auction with a non-trivial reserve price followed by a continuously decreasing price path. The
solution is described by a simple ordinary differential equation. Our analysis combines insights
from bargaining, auctions, and mechanism design.
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1 Introduction
Auction theory has found many applications ranging from private and public procurement to
takeover bidding and electronic commerce. Auctions are also gaining popularity in many newly
set-up markets for allocating resources such as energy, transportation, radio spectrum, and pollu-
tion permits. Conceptually, auction design is the focal application of the mechanism design theory,
which is now a standard tool for economic analysis. The vast majority of prior work on revenue
maximizing auctions has as its starting point the celebrated work of Myerson (1981) and Riley and
Samuelson (1981). Under a regularity condition, the optimal auction format is a standard auction
(e.g., a second-price auction or a first-price auction) with a reserve price strictly above the seller’s
reservation value. Consequently, a revenue-maximizing auction prescribes an inefficient exclusion
of some low-valued buyers.
To implement the optimal auction, it is crucial for the seller to be able to commit to withholding
an unsold object off the market permanently. If no bidders bid above the predetermined reserve
price, the seller has to stop auctioning the object even though there is common knowledge of
unrealized gains from trade. From a theoretical perspective, the full commitment assumption is
crucial for the validity of the revelation principle – an important tool that greatly simplifies the
analysis and has been instrumental for the advancement of the theory of auctions and more broadly
mechanism design. This assumption, however, is not entirely satisfactory in many applications. For
example, in the sale of art and antiques, real estate, automobiles, and spectrum licenses, aborted
auctions are common, but the destruction of unsold objects is rare or infeasible. Unsold objects
are often re-auctioned or offered for sale later.1 As such, understanding the role of commitment in
an auction setting is of both theoretical and practical importance. In this paper, we take a step in
this direction.
We revisit the classic auction model with one seller, a single indivisible object, and multiple
buyers, whose values are drawn independently from a common distribution. Different from the
classic auction model, if the object is not sold on previous occasions, the seller can sell it again with
no predetermined deadline. At the same time, we restrict attention to standard auction formats
with reserve prices rather than general mechanisms. More precisely, in each time period until the
object is sold, the seller posts a reserve price and holds a second-price auction.2 Each buyer can
either wait for a future auction or submit a bid no smaller than the reserve price. Waiting is
costly and both the buyers and the seller discount at the same rate. Within a period, the seller is
1For example, in the 2G spectrum auction run by the Indian government in November 2012, nearly half of the
spectrum blocks put up for sale went unsold due to high reserve prices. When asked about future government plans,
Kapil Sibal, the minister of communications and information technology, said, “Of course there will be an auction.
There is no doubt about that.” (http://newindianexpress.com/business/news/article1340726.ece). Failed auctions are
also common in U.S. government sale for offshore oil and gas leases (Porter, 1995), and in markets for fine arts where
around 20-30% of the objects up for sale do not sell at auction as reported by the Wall Street Journal (April 23,
2008).
2Allowing the seller to choose between standard auctions will not change our analysis and results.
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committed to the rules of the auction and the announced reserve price. The seller cannot, however,
commit to future reserve prices.
This simple setting is sufficiently rich to investigate the role of commitment. In our model, the
seller’s commitment power varies with the period length (or effectively with the discount factor). If
the period length is infinite, then the seller has full commitment power. As the period length shrinks,
the seller’s commitment power also diminishes. We adopt the solution concept of perfect Bayesian
equilibrium, which is well-defined for the discrete-time game, and develop a method to analyze the
continuous-time limit at which the seller’s commitment power vanishes. Within this framework,
we address the following questions: what is the set of equilibrium payoffs that is attainable by
the seller, and what is the equilibrium selling strategy that attains the maximal payoff? We find
that the full commitment profit is no longer achievable, and moreover, an efficient auction can
be revenue-maximizing. These results provide a deeper understanding of the role of commitment
power in auctions.
To illustrate, assume that the buyers’ valuations are uniformly distributed on [0, 1], and the
seller has a reservation value of 0. If there are two buyers, then in the continuous time limit,
the revenue-maximizing equilibrium involves an initial auction with reserve price 49 , followed by a
reserve price path given by pt =
4
9e
−rt, where r is the common discount rate. The resulting revenue
for the seller is 3181 , which is strictly below the revenue from Myerson’s optimal auction (
5
12), but
is strictly higher than the revenue from an efficient auction (13). Relative to the efficient auction
benchmark, the seller achieves more than half of the additional profit that can be extracted with
full commitment power. In contrast, if there are three or more buyers, an efficient auction—which
is given by pt = 0 for all t—is revenue-maximizing in the continuous time limit.
We are not the first to investigate the commitment assumption in auctions. A natural departure
from full commitment is to consider a model with a finite number of periods where the seller can
propose and commit to a mechanism in each period but cannot commit to mechanisms for future
periods. This is the approach taken by Skreta (2006, 2011). In her model, the seller effectively
has full commitment power in the last period and the backward induction logic applies. In fact,
the seller has the option to wait until the last period to run a Myerson optimal auction, which
attains the full commitment profit if she is patient. Despite the complications that arise with a
general class of mechanisms under limited commitment, Skreta shows that the optimal mechanism
is a sequence of standard auctions with reserve prices.3 The assumption of a finite horizon fits
important applications, such as flight or concert ticket sales, where the good must be consumed
before a fixed date. With durable goods and no binding deadline for a transaction, a finite horizon
model cannot fully capture the spirit of non-commitment. In line with the literature on dynamic
3Ho¨rner and Samuelson (2011), Chen (2012), and Dilme and Li (2012) analyze the dynamics of posted prices in
a finite horizon model. They assume that the winner is selected randomly when multiple buyers accept the posted
price.
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games, we find that our infinite horizon model generates equilibrium predictions which are very
different from the finite horizon model.
Several conceptual issues arise in the analysis of the seller’s maximal payoff in our model. First,
the full commitment solution is not feasible. Therefore, we have to characterize the set of feasible
solutions first. Second, with an infinite horizon, we cannot rely on backward induction to identify
an equilibrium. Finally, like Skreta, we cannot rely on the revelation principle because the seller
has limited commitment.4
The key idea we employ is to translate the limited-commitment problem into an auxiliary
mechanism design problem with full commitment. In the auxiliary problem, we impose an addi-
tional restriction on the feasible solutions. The restriction reflects a necessary sequential rationality
constraint faced by the seller in the original limited-commitment problem. Formally, the seller
maximizes revenue by choosing and committing to an auxiliary direct mechanism, which specifies
the trading time and transfers for every profile of reported buyer types in continuous time. If there
are no additional restrictions other than incentive compatibility and participation constraints, the
optimal solution is simply the optimal auction with full commitment: a buyer trades at time 0 if
his valuation is the highest and exceeds some predetermined reserve price, while all other buyers
never trade. In particular, if the valuation of the highest buyer is below the reserve price, no
trade will occur. The seller keeps the object and expects to earn zero continuation profit at every
point in time. This is in contrast to our original problem where the seller’s continuation value is
bounded away from zero—as we show, she can always run an efficient auction to end the game at
any point in time. Therefore, we impose a “payoff floor” constraint in the auxiliary problem as a
necessary condition for sequential rationality: at any point in time, the seller’s continuation payoff
in the auxiliary mechanism must be bounded below by the payoff from an efficient auction for the
corresponding posterior belief.5 The value of the auxiliary problem provides an upper bound for
the equilibrium payoffs in the original game (in the continuous-time limit). We proceed to solve
the auxiliary problem and show that its value and its solution can be approximated by a sequence
of equilibrium outcomes of the original game. Therefore, the value of the auxiliary problem is
precisely the maximal attainable equilibrium payoff in our original problem, and the solution to
the auxiliary problem is precisely the limiting selling strategy that attains this maximal payoff.6
Using the auxiliary problem, we obtain the following results. First, the full commitment profit
cannot be achieved under limited commitment because the reserve price must converge to zero
4Bester and Strausz (2001) develop a version of the revelation principle with limited commitment for environments
with one agent and a finite number of periods. It does not apply to our setting because our model has multiple buyers
(Bester and Strausz, 2000).
5Notice that, for a given auxiliary mechanism, the seller knows exactly which set of types are left at each moment in
time, if the mechanism is carried out. Consequently, she can compute the posterior beliefs as well as her continuation
payoff from the given mechanism.
6Wolitzky (2010) uses an auxiliary problem to analyze a Coasian bargaining model in which the seller cannot
commit to delivery. His auxiliary problem is much simpler because in his model there is always a no-trade equilibrium,
which allows him to show that the seller can achieve the full commitment profit.
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for any feasible solution. Second, the efficient auction is optimal if the number of bidders exceeds
a cutoff which depends on the type distribution.7 In this case, the efficient auction is also the
only feasible solution to the auxiliary problem. Third, if the number of bidders falls short of the
aforementioned cutoff, strictly positive reserve prices are feasible and the efficient auction is not
optimal. The cutoff only depends on the lower tail of the type distribution, because positive reserve
prices have to be sustainable in continuation games where the posterior type distributions are
the lower tail truncations of the prior type distribution. Finally, under the assumption that the
monopoly profit function is concave, the payoff floor constraint binds everywhere at the optimal
solution. This yields an ordinary differential equation that describes the optimal solution if the
efficient auction is not optimal. In this solution, the seller uses an auction with a strictly positive
reserve price at time zero. After the initial auction, the seller uses a smoothly declining price path
which is strictly positive and converges to zero only at infinity.
An alternative approach modeling limited commitment is to assume that the seller cannot
commit to trading rules even for the present period. This is the approach taken by McAdams and
Schwarz (2007) and Vartiainen (2013). McAdams and Schwarz (2007) consider an extensive form
game in which the seller can solicit multiple rounds of offers from buyers. Their paper shows that if
the cost of soliciting another round of offers is large, the seller can credibly commit to a first-price
auction, and if the cost is small, the equilibrium outcome approximates that of an English auction.
In Vartiainen (2013), a mechanism is a pure communication device that permits the seller to receive
messages from bidders. The seller cannot commit to any action after receiving the messages, and
there is no discounting. Vartiainen shows that the only credible mechanism is an English auction
because it reveals just the right amount of information such that it is optimal for the seller to
respect the rules of the auction. In contrast to these papers, we posit that the seller cannot renege
on the agreed terms of the trade. For example, this might be enforced by the legal environment.
A special case of our setup is the model of bilateral bargaining in which an uninformed seller
makes price offers to a single privately informed buyer. This model is equivalent to a durable
goods monopoly with a continuum of buyers. In his seminal paper, Coase (1972) argues that
a price-setting monopolist completely loses his monopoly power if she has the option to revise
prices frequently. Game theoretic analysis shows that there are in fact two types of equilibria in
the Coasian bargaining model (see Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole, 1985; Gul, Sonnenschein, and
Wilson, 1986; Ausubel and Deneckere, 1989).8 In the“gap”case, where the seller’s reservation value
is strictly below the lowest valuation of the buyer, every equilibrium satisfies the Coase conjecture.
7In the case of the uniform distribution, the cutoff is between two and three as illustrated above. This cutoff
applies more generally to all distributions with a strictly positive density that has a bounded derivative.
8See also Stokey (1981) and Bulow (1982). The commitment issue in durable goods monopoly has been analyzed
in richer environments, see, e.g. Sobel (1991) and Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2010) for models with entry of new buyers.
Ausubel, Cramton, and Deneckere (2002) survey the extensive literature on bilateral bargaining and the Coase
conjecture. Strulovici (2013) considers a more general setting in which the two parties can negotiate and renegotiate
long-term contracts instead of just prices.
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In the limit, as the period length converges to zero, the prices posted by the seller converge to the
lowest buyer-valuation and her profit converges to the competitive level. A Coase conjecture result
for the “gap” case in an auction setting is obtained by McAfee and Vincent (1997).
Our model corresponds to the “no gap” case. The equilibrium construction, which we use
to justify our auxiliary mechanism design approach, draws insights from Ausubel and Deneckere
(1989). They show that there exist equilibria of the bilateral bargaining model in which the seller
can credibly maintain high prices. Their equilibrium price path is sustained by a trigger strategy: as
long as the seller plays “tough” by following a slowly decreasing price path, the buyer best responds
to the equilibrium price path. If the seller deviates, the buyer switches to the Coasian equilibrium
strategy, forcing the seller to lower prices quickly and to obtain a profit close to zero. Since the
punishment profit converges to zero in the limit, the equilibrium price path can be calibrated to
approximate the full commitment solution.
In our model with multiple buyers, this reasoning does not apply directly. In particular, we
show that the seller can guarantee herself at least the revenue from an efficient auction which is
strictly positive. This severely restricts the effectiveness of the punishment after a deviation, so
that the full commitment revenue is not attainable. We give general conditions under which the
punishment is completely futile even for a small numbers of bidders. When these conditions are
not met, our analysis characterizes the maximal attainable revenue, and also confirms the intuition
that an efficient auction is indeed the most effective punishment and a trigger strategy equilibrium
maximizes the seller’s payoff.
There is also a recent and growing literature on dynamic mechanism design. See for example
Courty and Li (2000), Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2013), Board and Skrzypacz (2013) and Eso and
Szentes (2007) among many others, as well as the surveys by Bergemann and Said (2011) and
Gershkov and Moldovanu (2012). This literature focuses on models with dynamic populations,
dynamic arrival of information, and learning, and often assumes full commitment power. We did
not consider such applications in order to focus on the central issue of limited commitment.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we formally introduce the model and
develop some structural properties of equilibria in discrete time. In Section 3, we introduce the
auxiliary full commitment mechanism design problem. Section 4 contains our main results regarding
optimal solutions to the auxiliary problem. Section 5 links the mechanism design problem with full
commitment to the original problem of finding seller optimal equilibria in the discrete time game.
Section 6 concludes with a discussion of our main assumptions and directions for future research.
All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
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2 Model
Consider the standard auction environment where a seller (she) wants to sell an indivisible object




) ∈ [0, 1]n to denote the vector of the n buyers’ valuations, and v ∈ [0, 1] to denote
a generic buyer’s valuation. Each vi is drawn independently from a common distribution F (·)
with full support and continuously differentiable density f (·) such that f(v) > 0 for all v ∈ (0, 1).




is denoted by v(n) and its corresponding
distribution by F (n). The seller’s reservation value for the object is 0.9
Time is discrete and the period length is denoted by ∆. In each period t = 0,∆, 2∆, . . . , the
seller runs a second-price auction (SPA) to sell the object if it has not been sold yet.10 To simplify
notation, we often do not explicitly note the dependence of the game on ∆. The timing within
period t is as follows. First, the seller publicly announces a reserve price pt for the auction run in
period t and invites all buyers to submit a valid bid, which is restricted to the interval [pt, 1]. After
observing pt, all buyers decide simultaneously either to bid or to wait. If at least one valid bid is
submitted, the winner and the payment is determined according to the rules of the second-price
auction and the game ends. If no valid bid is submitted, the game proceeds to the next period. Both
the seller and the buyers are risk-neutral and have a common discount rate r > 0 (or a discount
factor per period equal to δ = e−r∆ < 1). If buyer i wins in period t and has to make a payment
pii, then his payoff is e−rt
(
vi − pii) and the seller’s payoff is e−rtpii.
We assume that the seller has limited commitment power. She can commit to the auction
format and the reserve price that she announces for the current period: if a valid bid is placed, then
the object is sold according to the proposed auction and she cannot renege. She cannot commit,
however, to future reserve prices: if the object was not sold in a period, the seller can always run
another auction with a new reserve price in the next period. She cannot promise to stop auctioning
an unsold object, or commit to a predetermined sequence of reserve prices.
Denote by ht = (p0, p∆, . . . , pt−∆) the public history at the beginning of t if no bidder has
placed a valid bid up to t and write h0 = Ø for the history at which the seller chooses the first
reserve price.11 Let Ht be the set of such histories. A (behavioral) strategy for the seller specifies a
function pt : Ht → P[0, 1] for each t = 0,∆, 2∆, . . ., where P[0, 1] is the space of Borel probability
measures endowed with the weak∗ topology. A (behavioral) strategy for buyer i specifies a function
bit : Ht × [0, 1] × [0, 1] → P[0, 1] for each t = 0,∆, 2∆, . . ., where we assume that bit(ht, pt, vi) is
Borel-measurable in vi, for all ht ∈ Ht, and all pt ∈ [0, 1], and that supp bit(ht, pt, vi) ⊂ {0}∪ [pt, 1].
We consider perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE), and we will focus on equilibria that are buyer
9The important assumption here is that the seller’s reservation value is no smaller than lower bound of the support
of the buyers’ values, i.e., we are in the “no-gap” case. The rest is normalization.
10Our analysis does not change if the seller uses any standard auction instead.
11We do not have to consider other histories because the game ends if someone places a valid bid.
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symmetric.12 We will not distinguish between strategies that coincide with probability one for all
histories. In the rest of the paper, “equilibrium” is used to refer to this class of perfect Bayesian
equilibria. Let E (∆) denote the set of equilibria of the game for given ∆. Let Π∆ (p, b) denote
seller’s expected revenue derived from equilibrium (p, b) ∈ E (∆) . We are interested in the maximal
profit the seller can achieve in the limit when the period length vanishes:




Π∆ (p, b) .
The analysis of the continuous time limit is more tractable and we will justify our approach by
providing approximations through discrete time equilibria. An alternative approach is to set up the
model directly in continuous time. This alternative approach, however, has unresolved conceptual
issues regarding the definition of strategies and equilibrium concepts in continuous time games of
perfect monitoring, which are beyond the scope of this paper.13
It is worth noting that when n = 1, our setup reduces to the model of Ausubel and Deneckere
(1989) where the seller is restricted to post prices. They show that there are two classes of equilibria.
The first class are weak-Markov equilibria. These equilibria satisfy the Coase conjecture and have
a limit profit of zero. The second class are non-Markov reputational equilibria. Each reputational
equilibrium consists of an equilibrium price path and a punishment which is taken from a weak-
Markov equilibrium. The equilibrium price path starts with an arbitrary initial price and may
decline at an arbitrarily slow rate as ∆ becomes small. A deviation from the equilibrium path
by the seller is deterred by a threat to switch to the weak-Markov equilibrium. By adjusting the
initial price and the rate of the decline, the seller can attain any profit between zero and the static
monopoly profit. In other words, in the bargaining set up, Π∗ is the monopoly profit. Even though
the seller lacks full commitment power, there are equilibria where she can attain a profit arbitrarily
close to what she could get with full commitment power.
From now on, we assume that n ≥ 2. With multiple buyers the model behaves quite differently.
Weak-Markov equilibria still exist and they satisfy the Coase conjecture in the sense that the seller
looses her monopoly power in these equilibria (see Section 5), but there is an important difference
to the case of one buyer: With multiple buyers, the seller always earns a strictly positive profit.
In particular, the seller always has the option to run a second price auction without reserve price
to end the game, which yields a strictly positive profit (see Lemma 3). This imposes a lower
bound on the punishment that can be used to support an equilibrium with higher profits. As a
result, Π∗ must be lower than the profit under full commitment since this profit could only be
achieved by a constant reserve price equal to the static optimal reserve price, which would require
a punishment that reduces the seller’s profit to zero. Therefore, finding Π∗ is a mechanism design
12See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for the definition of PBE in finite games. The extension to infinite games is
straightforward.
13See Bergin and MacLeod (1993) and Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2010) for related discussions.
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problem. Moreover, the equilibrium construction is significantly more complex than in the bilateral
bargaining setting where arbitrary price paths can be implemented.
In order to characterize the maximal profit Π∗, we start with three basic lemmas. The first
lemma states that in every equilibrium of the game, all buyers play pure strategies that can be
characterized by cutoffs. In particular, a buyer’s strategy in period t can be summarized by a cutoff
βt which depends only on the sequence of reserve prices announced up to period t.
14 Given our
symmetry restriction, this cutoff βt is the same for all buyers.
Lemma 1. Let (p, b) ∈ E(∆). Then, for each t = 0,∆, 2∆, . . ., there exists a function βt : Ht ×
[0, 1] → [0, 1] such that every bidder with valuation above βt(ht, pt) places a valid bid and every
bidder with valuation below βt(ht, pt) waits if the seller announces reserve price pt at history ht.
Proof. The proof follows from the same arguments as the proof of Lemma 10.1 in Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991).
The second lemma shows that, although the seller is allowed to randomize, randomization on
the equilibrium path is not necessary to attain the optimal profit.
Lemma 2. For every equilibrium (p, b) ∈ E(∆), there exists an equilibrium (p′, b′) ∈ E(∆) in which
the seller does not randomize on the equilibrium path and achieves a profit at least as high as in
(p, b).
Proof. All omitted proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that the maximal profit of the seller can be achieved in an equilibrium
that implements a deterministic allocation rule (up to tie-breaking).
The third lemma shows the seller can ensure a continuation profit no smaller than the profit of
an efficient auction. This restriction on continuation payoffs plays a critical role in our analysis.
Lemma 3. Fix any equilibrium (p, b) ∈ E(∆) and any history ht. If the seller announces the
reserve price pt = 0 at this history (this may not be an equilibrium strategy), then every bidder bids
their true values and the game ends.
Next, we present several technical assumptions on the distribution function F that are necessary
for our subsequent analysis. As is standard in the literature, we assume that the distribution F
has the monotone virtual value (monotone marginal revenue) property.
Assumption A1 J(v) := v − (1− F (v)) /f(v) is strictly increasing on [0, 1].
In addition, we will make two regularity assumptions on the distribution F . First, we need a mild
assumption on the tail of the distribution:
14This result is an analog of a result by Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (1985).
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Assumption A2 limv→0 (f ′(v)v) /f(v) exists and is finite.
This assumption is satisfied, for example, if the density function f is bounded away from 0 and
has a bounded derivative. It is also satisfied for a much more general class of distributions which
includes densities with f(0) = 0. For instance, consider a family of power function distributions
F (v) = vk with k > 0. For this family, we have (f ′(v)v) /f(v) = k − 1 independent of v.
Assumption A3 There exist 0 < M ≤ 1 ≤ L <∞ and α > 0 such that Mvα ≤ F (v) ≤ Lvα for
all v ∈ [0, 1].
This regularity assumption is adopted from Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) whose bargaining model
can be viewed as a special case of our auction model. Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) use this
assumption to establish the existence of weak-Markov equilibria and prove the uniform Coase
conjecture. We extend these two basic results to our auction setting.
For one of our results, we need the following more restrictive assumption. Later, we will be
explicit about when this assumption is used.
Assumption A4 The revenue function v(1− F (v)) is concave on [0, 1].
Assumption A4 is equivalent to assuming that J(v)f(v) is increasing. It is also equivalent to
(f ′(v)v)/f(v) > −2. For example, the family of power function distributions given by F (v) = vk
satisfies Assumption A4 for all k > 0.
3 A Mechanism Design Approach to Limited Commitment
To solve for Π∗, we consider an auxiliary mechanism design problem in which the seller has full
commitment power but is restricted by a sequential rationality constraint. We formulate the auxil-
iary problem in continuous time, and consider direct mechanisms in which all buyers make a single
report of their valuations at time zero. Depending on the profile of reports, a mechanism selects a
winner, a trading time, and a payment. In our definition, direct mechanisms must satisfy a number
of properties inherited from equilibria in the original game. We first give an overview of these
properties before we formally define the mechanism design framework.
Basic Properties of Direct Mechanisms: The first set of constraints are derived from prop-
erties of buyer symmetric equilibria in a sequence of second price auctions.15 The allocation rule
must be symmetric, only the buyer with the highest type can win the object, buyers with high
valuations trade earlier than buyers with lower valuations, and only the winner makes a payment.
Since we are interested in the limits of equilibrium outcomes, we will impose these restrictions on
the trading time, winner selection, and payment rule.
15If we would study a general mechanism design problem, we would not have to impose these conditions on the
allocation rules and payment rules that can be implemented in equilibrium.
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Incentive Constraints for the Buyers: Since we assume that buyers report their types at
time zero, their incentives only depend on the discounted trading probabilities and the discounted
payments. Therefore, buyer incentive constraints in the auxiliary problem are identical to incentive
compatibility constraints from static mechanism design problems, except that winning probabilities
and payments are replaced by discounted winning probabilities and discounted payments.
Sequential Rationality for the Seller (The Payoff Floor Constraint): Finally, in the orig-
inal game, the seller always has the option to run an efficient auction to end the game. This
imposes a necessary lower bound on the continuation profit on the equilibrium path. Therefore, we
impose the constraint that the expected discounted continuation profit of the seller is at least as
high as the revenue of an efficient auction for the given posterior at each point in time. The explicit
specification of trading times in our mechanisms is necessary for the formulation of this constraint,
because it allows us to construct the posterior distribution for each point in time. The payoff floor
constraint is the crucial element in the auxiliary problem which distinguishes it from a standard
mechanism design problem under full commitment.
In the following, we define the trading time, winner selection rule and payment rule, as well as
the constraints formally.
3.1 Direct Mechanisms




and for each buyer i, the
trading time τ i : [0, 1]n → [0,+∞] and corresponding payment pii : [0, 1]n → R. If τ i(vi, v−i) <∞,
buyer i is awarded the object at time τ i(vi, v−i) and the payment pii(vi, v−i) is also made at time
τ i(vi, v−i). If τ i(vi, v−i) =∞, then i is not awarded the object for the given type profile.
Motivated by the properties of equilibria in the discrete time game, we impose the following
restrictions on the set of direct mechanisms (τ, pi):




=∞ if vi < v(n). Ties are broken randomly.16




= 0 if vi < v(n).
















for every permutation σ.









v(n) = vˆ(n) = vˆi.
5. Higher types trade earlier: if vi = v(n) ≤ vˆ(n) = vˆi, then τ i(vˆi, vˆ−i) ≥ τ i(vi, v−i).
16We do not formally include the randomization in the definition of τ because ties occur with probability zero.
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6. If buyer i wins, he pays pii(vi, v−i) at time τ i(vi, v−i).
The tuple (τ, pi), together with restriction 6 and the tie-breaking rule, fully specifies the allocation
and the payment rule of a direct mechanism. Therefore, with slight abuse of notation, we call (τ, pi)
a direct mechanism. For a given direct mechanism (τ, pi), the discounted trading probability of













j : vj = v(n)
}e−rτ i(vi,v−i).














The symmetry and monotonicity restrictions on trading time τ i enable us to describe τ i by a single
function T : [0, 1]→ [0,∞], which describes the trading time of the buyer with the highest type.
Lemma 4. Let (τ, pi) be a direct mechanism. Then there exists a non-increasing function T :





j : vj = v(n)
}e−rT (vi). (3.1)
3.2 Buyer Incentive Compatibility
For a given direct mechanism (τ, pi), we define the expected discounted trading probability of





















. A direct mechanism (τ, pi) is incentive compatible if the following (static) in-




)−M i (vi) ≥ viQi (vˆi)−M i (vˆi) . (3.2)







) − M i (vi). Note that by
Restriction 1, a buyer with type vi = 0 gets the object with probability 0, and by Restriction 2,
his payment is zero. Therefore, we must have U i (0) = 0. Using standard techniques (Krishna,










Together with monotonicity of Qi, this condition is sufficient for incentive compatibility. Instead of
imposing monotonicity on Qi, however, we note that (3.1) implies that the monotonicity constraint
can be imposed directly on the trading time function T .
13
Lemma 5. Let T : [0, 1] → [0,+∞] be non-increasing. Then there exists an incentive compatible
direct mechanism (τ, pi) with
τ i(vi, v−i) = T (vi) · 1{vi=v(n)}.
Next, we show that every incentive compatible direct mechanism satisfying Restrictions 1–6
corresponds to a sequence of cutoffs (vt)t∈R that describe the allocation rule and a sequence of
reserve prices (pt)t∈R that implements this allocation rule. Let us define
vt := sup {v |T (v) ≥ t} .
That is, vt is the highest type that does not trade before time t. Since all buyers with types v > vt
trade before t, the posterior distribution at t, conditional on the event that the object has not
yet been allocated, is given by the truncated distribution F (v|v ≤ vt). Therefore, we call vt the
posterior at time t. Generally, vt is continuous from the left, and since it is non-increasing, the




For each t, v+t is the highest type in the posterior after time t if the object is not yet sold.
Next, we define a sequence of prices (pt)t∈R which implement cutoffs (vt)t∈R. This means at
time t, type v+t is indifferent between buying immediately at price pt and waiting.
17 All higher
types strictly prefer to bid before or at time t, whereas all lower types strictly prefer to wait.
Lemma 6. Let T : [0, 1] → [0,+∞] be non-increasing and (vt)t∈R the corresponding sequence of















Notice that if the cutoff path is steep (i.e., the cutoff vt declines quickly) then the price path
pt is also steep. A steeper cutoff path also implies that the payoff for the cutoff type, v
+
t − pt, is
larger because waiting becomes more attractive. If vt is differentiable, we have v
+
t = vt, and we
can use a change of variables to obtain an expression for pt in terms of vt only:









17Note that v+t is the infimum of all types that trade at time t. Therefore, if the reserve price at time t is pt, the
buyer with valuation v+t will pay price pt if she makes a truthful bid at time t and this bid wins.
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3.3 The Payoff Floor Constraint
The seller chooses a mechanism to maximize her expected revenue. Using the envelope condition,
















































where the last step follows from Lemma 4.
Without further constraints, the following trading time function
TM (v) :=
0 if J(v) ≥ 0,∞ if J(v) < 0,
maximizes the seller’s expected discounted revenue Π. The trading time TM corresponds to the
allocation rule of the revenue-maximizing auction with full commitment as characterized by Myerson
(1981). The object is allocated to the buyer with the highest valuation if his virtual valuation is
non-negative. Otherwise the object is not sold. The corresponding cutoff path is constant and
satisfies J(vt) = 0 for all t > 0. By equation (3.3), the seller must use the constant path of reserve
prices given by J(pt) = 0 in order to implement this allocation rule.
Since the seller has limited commitment power, not every incentive compatible direct mechanism
describes the limit of equilibrium outcomes of our original game. In particular, the seller can always
run a second-price auction without reserve price to end the game at any point in time. Therefore, we
formulate an additional constraint that will capture the spirit of the seller’s sequential rationality.






∣∣∣ v(n) ≤ vt] ≥ ΠE(vt). (3.5)
We dub this condition the “payoff floor” constraint. The right-hand side of the constraint, ΠE(vt),
is the profit of an efficient auction when the type distribution is F (v|v ≤ vt). On the left-hand side
of (3.5), we have the continuation profit at time t if the object has not been allocated yet.
One solution that always satisfies this constraint is the direct mechanism defined by the efficient
allocation rule:
TE(v) = 0, ∀v ∈ [0, 1].
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This solution corresponds to a second-price auction with reserve price pt = 0 at time t = 0. Since
we have vt = 0 for all t > 0, the payoff floor constraint is trivially satisfied for t > 0. For t = 0, the
constraint is trivially satisfied because we have the profit of an efficient auction on both sides.
In order to maximize revenue subject to (3.5), we need a more tractable formulation. If we
define
Jt(v) := v − F (vt|v ≤ vt)− F (v|v ≤ vt)
f (v|v ≤ vt) = v −



















In order to reformulate the continuation profit on the left-hand side, we now show that under Re-
strictions 1–6, our definition of incentive compatibility of mechanisms in (3.2) also implies incentive
compatibility for all t.
Lemma 7. Let (τ, pi) be an incentive compatible direct mechanism. Then for all t and all vi, vˆi ∈












)∣∣∣ v(n) ≤ vt] vi − Ev−i [mi (vˆi, v−i)∣∣∣ v(n) ≤ vt] . (3.6)
Although buyers do not submit reports at time t > 0, we have obtained a condition that
formally resembles an incentive constraint at time t. This is not surprising. A buyer with valuation
vi ≤ vt is only interested in the allocations at time t or later because he cannot get the object
before t. Moreover, a report vi ≤ vt will not affect possible allocations to other buyers before time
t. Therefore, in a hypothetical situation where all buyers with type vi ≤ vt are asked to report at
time t, their incentives are exactly the same as at time zero. In this sense (3.6) can be interpreted
as a period t incentive constraint.

































where we have used the envelope condition and Lemma 4 to obtain the last line. Multiplying both
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sides of (3.5) by Fn(vt), we obtain the following formulation for the payoff floor constraint.
ˆ vt
0





3.4 The Auxiliary Problem






s.t. T is non-increasing,
∀t ≥ 0 :
ˆ vt
0





In Section 5, we will show the close linkage between the auxiliary problem with full commitment
and our original problem with limited commitment, which justifies our mechanism design approach.
In particular, we will show that (a) the trading time functions obtained as limits of equilibrium
outcomes (as ∆ → 0) must lie in the feasible set of the auxiliary problem, and (b) the optimal
solutions to the auxiliary problem we construct in Section 4, are limits of equilibrium outcomes in
the discrete time game (as ∆ → 0). Therefore, in order to find the revenue-maximizing equilibria
in our original problem, it is adequate to solve the auxiliary problem.
We have already seen above that the feasible set of the auxiliary problem is non-empty because
it contains the efficient auction TE . As we will see in the next section, there may also be feasible
but inefficient solutions where the allocations to low types are delayed. The object cannot, however,
remain unsold forever with positive probability. In particular, the full commitment solution is not
feasible.
Theorem 1. Suppose T is a feasible solution to the auxiliary problem. Then T (v) < ∞ for all
v > 0. In particular, the optimal auction under full commitment TM is not feasible.
The intuition is straightforward. If T (v) = ∞ for all v ∈ [0, v¯], where v¯ > 0, then the seller’s
posterior converges to vt = v¯ as t→∞. With vt converging to v¯, the probability that a trade takes
place after time t vanishes. Therefore, the continuation revenue converges to zero. This, however,
violates the payoff floor constraint because the profit of an efficient auction is strictly positive as
vt ≥ v¯ > 0.
To conclude this section, we note first that standard techniques can be used to show that an
optimal solution to the auxiliary problem exists.
Proposition 1. An optimal solution to the auxiliary problem exists.
Second, we note that the value of the auxiliary problem does not depend on r.
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Proposition 2. The value of the auxiliary problem is independent of r > 0. Moreover, if T is a
feasible solution for given r, then Tˆ (v) := (r/rˆ)T (v), defines a feasible solution for the auxiliary
problem for rˆ > 0. The profit under rˆ and Tˆ is equal to the profit under r and T .
In continuous time, r only determines how much delay is needed to reduce the value of an
allocation or a payment by a certain amount, but a change in r does not affect the possibility of
destroying value by delaying an allocation. Thus, a change in r is equivalent to a change in the
unit of measurement for time, which is irrelevant if t is a continuous variable.
4 Revenue-Maximizing Auctions
In order to obtain optimal solutions to the auxiliary problem, we first argue that it is revenue-
improving for the seller to use positive reserve prices whenever this is credible. In other words,
the efficient auction (TE) is optimal if and only if it is the only feasible solution to the auxiliary
problem. It is clear that any feasible solution yields a profit that is at least as high as the profit of the
efficient auction. Otherwise, the payoff floor constraint would be violated at t = 0. The following
proposition shows that if positive reserve prices are feasible, that is, the feasible set includes a
solution with delayed trade for low types, then the seller can achieve a strictly higher revenue than
in the efficient auction.
Proposition 3. An efficient auction (TE) is an optimal solution to the auxiliary problem if and
only if it is the only feasible solution.
To get an intuition for this result, compare the efficient auction in which all types trade at
time zero, to an alternative feasible solution in which only the types in (v+0 , 1] trade at time zero,
where v+0 < 1.
18 There are two effects that determine how the profits of these two solutions are
ranked. First, in the alternative, the trade of low types is delayed, which creates an inefficiency.
Second, the delay for the low types reduces information rents for higher types. We must argue
that the total reduction in information rents exceeds the inefficiency, so that the ex-ante profit is
higher under the alternative solution. We first consider the reduction in information rents only
for the types in [0, v+0 ]. This is what matters for the continuation profit at time 0
+, that is, right
after the initial trade. Feasibility implies that the reduction in information rents for the types in
[0, v+0 ] must already (weakly) exceed the revenue loss from inefficiency. Otherwise, the continuation
profit at 0+ would be smaller than the profit from an efficient auction given the posterior [0, v+0 ],
and thus the payoff floor constraint would be violated. If we now include the types in (v+0 , 1] in
the comparison, we must add the reduction in information rents for these types but there is no
additional inefficiency because these types trade at time zero in both solutions. Therefore, the total
18In the proof of Proposition 3, we show that we can always construct a feasible solution with 0 < v+0 < 1, if there
exists any feasible solution that differs from the efficient auction.
18
reduction in information rents is strictly higher than the inefficiency, and the ex-ante profit under
the alternative is strictly higher than under the efficient auction.
Proposition 3 implies that in order to show that the efficient auction is optimal, it suffices to
show that it is the unique feasible solution. It turns out that this depends solely on the lower tail






Remark 1. By Assumption A2, φ is well-defined and finite. Moreover, we can show that every
distribution for which φ is well-defined satisfies φ ≥ −1. To understand this observation, consider
distributions for which f
′(v)v
f(v) is independent of v in a neighborhood of zero. If this is the case,
then the distribution function F must look like a CRRA utility function with relative risk aversion
coefficient ρ = −φ. It is well-known that for ρ ≥ 1, CRRA utility functions are unbounded at zero.
Hence, we must have φ > −1 to obtain a distribution function. For general distributions, we show
in the Appendix that φ ≥ −1, and rule out the knife-edge case of φ = −1 by assumption.19
Our first main result is that there exists a distribution-specific cutoff





such that the efficient auction is optimal if and only if the number of bidders n exceeds N(F ).
Theorem 2. Suppose φ > −1.
(i) If n < N(F ), the efficient auction is not optimal and the optimal solution has strictly positive
reserve prices.
(ii) If n > N(F ), the efficient auction is optimal and it is the only feasible solution for the auxiliary
problem.
If F is uniform, then φ = 0 and the cutoff is 1 +
√
2. Therefore, the efficient auction is optimal
if there are three or more bidders. If there are two bidders, positive reserve prices are feasible and
the seller can achieve a higher profit than in the efficient auction. Under mild assumptions on the
type distribution, this property holds more generally as the following corollary shows. The second
part of the corollary gives a sufficient condition under which φ = 1 so that N(F ) = 1+
√
3/2 < 2.20
Corollary 1. (i) If the density satisfies f(0) > 0 and has a bounded derivative at 0, then the
efficient auction is optimal if n ≥ 3. If n ≤ 2, the seller maximizes her revenue by using
positive reserve prices.
19This is a mild assumption but it is not without loss of generality. For example, for the distribution function
F (v) = v(ln(1/v))
−(1/2)
, we have φ = −1. We thank Yuliy Sannikov for providing this example.
20We thank Bernard Salanie´ for pointing out this case.
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(ii) If the density is twice continuously differentiable at zero, f(0) = 0 and f ′(0) 6= 0, then the
efficient auction is optimal for all n ≥ 2.
Despite the observation that the cutoff is often very low, there is also a natural class of distri-
butions, for which N(F ) can become arbitrarily large (see Example 2 below).
At first glance, it seems surprising that the existence of feasible solutions that differ from the
efficient auction only depends on the lower tail of the distribution. The intuition is as follows. Notice
that the seller’s posterior is a truncation from above of the original distribution. Therefore, the tail
of the distribution determines the set of equilibria in subgames which start after sufficiently many
periods. Suppose the tail of the distribution allows multiple equilibria in every subgame starting
in period t+ ∆. Then, there are also multiple equilibria in any subgame starting at t. In contrast,
if the tail of the distribution pins down a unique continuation equilibrium for all possible histories
after sufficiently many periods, then there is a unique equilibrium in the whole game. Therefore,
the existence of multiple equilibria, and thus the multiplicity of solutions to the auxiliary problem,
only depend on the tail of the distribution.
When the number of buyers is small, that is n < N(F ), Theorem 2 shows that the seller uses
strictly positive reserve prices to maximize her revenue. Our second main result characterizes the
optimal selling strategy for this case. If we impose Assumption A4, the payoff floor constraint
binds for all t > 0 at the optimal solution.
Proposition 4. If v(1−F (v)) is concave, then for every optimal solution, the payoff floor constraint
binds for all t > 0.
If the payoff floor constraint binds everywhere, then the cutoff vt is twice continuously differen-












n−1 − 2 ´ vt0 (F (v))n−1 dv
}
f (vt)
(n− 1) ´ vt0 [F (vt)− F (v)] (F (v))n−2 f (v) vdv
.
If n < N(F ), this ODE has a decreasing solution (see Lemma 15 in Appendix A.3.2) and we have
the following result:
Theorem 3. If v(1−F (v)) is concave and n < N(F ), the optimal solution to the auxiliary problem








To illustrate this result, we discuss several examples in which we obtain a closed-form solution
for the ODE in (4.1) and the initial value v+0 . Generally, the optimal initial value can be computed
by inserting the solution to the ODE into the seller’s objective function and maximizing over v+0 .
For some distributions this can be done in closed form. We begin with the uniform distribution.
Example 1 (Uniform Distribution). Suppose the buyers’ types are uniformly distributed: v ∼
U [0, 1]. Then φ = 0 and N(F ) = 1 +
√
2. It follows from Theorem 2 that the efficient auction is
optimal if n ≥ 3, and the efficient auction is not optimal if n = 2. In the case of n = 2, the ODE
in (4.1) becomes
v¨t + rv˙t = 0.
The solution to this ODE is vt = v
+
0 e
−rt, and the corresponding trading time is given by
T (v) =
0 if v > v
+
0 ,
− (ln v − ln v+0 ) /r if v ≤ v+0 .
By inserting T (v) into the seller’s objective function and maximizing over v+0 , we obtain the optimal
cutoff v+0 = 2/3. We can then obtain the optimal sequence of reserve prices pt = (4/9)e
−rt from
Lemma 6. Since both vt and pt are strictly positive for all t > 0 and converge to zero as t → ∞,
the object is sold eventually but the game may not end in finite time. This is a general feature of
the optimal solution for any distribution if n < N(F ). 
Example 2 (Power Function Distribution). Suppose the buyers’ valuations are distributed accord-
ing to F (v) = vk with support [0, 1] and k > 0. Then, φ = k − 1 and N(F ) = 1 +√1 + k/k. The






+ r = 0,
where
κ = (k − 1)− (nk − k − 1) (nk + 1)
(n− 1) k .





where ρ = r/ (1 + κ). Therefore, if κ > −1, then 0 < ρ < r, and the solution to the ODE is
decreasing. This corresponds to the case that n < N(F ). Indeed, it is easy to verify that κ > −1 if
and only if n < N(F ). In contrast, if κ < −1, or equivalently n > N(F ), the solution to the ODE is
increasing, so that the binding payoff floor constraint does not yield a feasible solution. This is not
surprising since by Theorem 2 the efficient auction is optimal and also the only feasible solution.
To illustrate, we can set n = 3 and k = 1 so that F is uniform. Then κ = −2 and the solution of
the ODE becomes vt = v
+
0 e
rt which is increasing. 
21
In the remainder of this section, we give an overview of the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3. The
formal proofs can be found in Appendix A.3. Both results follow from the analysis of the binding
payoff floor constraint. As the first step, we show that if T is a feasible solution for which the payoff
floor constraint is binding for all t > 0, then vt is twice continuously differentiable and satisfies the
ODE in (4.1) (see Lemmas 12 and 13 in Appendix A.3.1). Second, this ODE yields a feasible
solution to the auxiliary problem if n < N(F ) (see Lemma 15 in Appendix A.3.2). Proposition
3, together with the construction of a feasible solution that is different from the efficient auction
(via the binding payoff floor constraint), implies part (i) of Theorem 2. If n > N(F ) the solution
to the binding payoff floor constraint is infeasible because the cutoffs vt given by the ODE are
increasing in t (see also Lemma 15). This observation, however, is not enough to prove part (ii)
of Theorem 2, because there could exist a feasible solution to the auxiliary problem for which the
payoff floor constraint is not binding everywhere. Therefore, in our third step, we seek conditions
under which the optimal solution is given by the binding payoff floor constraint. If the payoff floor
constraint must be binding at the optimal solution, then the efficient auction must be optimal
whenever the solution to the binding payoff floor constraint is increasing (and hence infeasible).
The sufficient condition that we identify is concavity of the monopoly profit (see Lemmas 16–20
in Appendix A.3.3). We prove that for all distributions, the monopoly profit function is locally
concave for valuations close to zero. Using this, we can show that the payoff floor constraint must
be binding for all t where vt is sufficiently small. This is not possible with a decreasing cutoff path
if n > N(F ). Hence, the efficient auction must be optimal, which proves part (ii) of Theorem 2
without imposing Assumption A4. Finally, for Proposition 4 and Theorem 3, we need Assumption
A4, which requires global concavity. This implies the solution of the ODE is the optimal solution
if n < N(F ).
In order to establish that the payoff floor constraint must bind at the optimal solution, we
construct feasible variations of solutions for which the payoff floor constraint is slack for a time
interval (a, b). Roughly speaking, the variation we consider spreads out the trades that happen
between a and b. For the high types in the interval (v+b , va], we decrease the trading time, and for
the low types we increase the trading time. Such a variation is always possible. We show that either
some types trade in the interior of (a, b), or all trades must be concentrated on the endpoint b. In
the former case, we can move the trading times of these types towards a and b, respectively, and
for the latter, we can split the set of types that trade at b, delay the trading times of the low types,
and advance the trading times of the high types. If the monopoly profit v(1− F (v)) is concave on
the interval of valuations that trade between a and b, then we prove that such a variation is not
only feasible but also improves the seller’s ex-ante expected profit. If v(1 − F (v)) is convex, we
have to construct a variation that concentrates the trading times of the types that trade between
a and b, rather than spreading them out. Such a variation, however, is only feasible if the trade is
not already concentrated on a single point in time. Therefore, with a non-concave monopoly profit,
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we cannot rule out that the payoff floor constraint is slack on some interval if there is an atom of
trade at the end of the interval.21
5 Connecting the Mechanism Design Approach to Discrete Time
Equilibria
Our auxiliary mechanism design approach derives necessary implications from the seller’s sequential
rationality, which every equilibrium in discrete time must satisfy, and formulates them as the payoff
floor constraint which is imposed on the set of feasible mechanisms in continuous time. Now we
establish sufficiency of the payoff floor constraint: the optimal solution to our auxiliary problem is
the limit of a sequence of equilibrium outcomes in our original discrete time game. We start by
showing that there exists a family of equilibria in discrete time that implements outcomes converging
to the efficient auction as ∆ → 0 (see Subsection 5.1). In this class of equilibria, reserve prices
converge to zero as ∆ → 0 and the seller’s profit converges to the profit of an efficient auction.
Therefore, they satisfy a generalized version of the Coase conjecture in the auction setting.
In Subsection 5.2, we construct equilibria in trigger strategies that converge to the solution of
the binding payoff floor constraint as ∆ → 0. On the equilibrium path, the seller uses reserve
prices that approximate the reserve prices defined by the binding payoff floor constraint. The
approximation is constructed such that the payoff floor constraint is strictly slack. Hence, the
seller’s continuation profit on the equilibrium path is above the profit of an efficient auction. A
deviation by the seller is punished by switching to a Coasian equilibrium, which yields a lower
profit than the seller’s on-path profit. Therefore, the seller has no incentive to deviate from the
equilibrium price path. In the limit as ∆→ 0, the punishment profit converges to the profit of the
efficient auction, and the equilibrium cutoff path converges to the solution of the binding payoff
floor constraint.
Subsections 5.1 and 5.2 establish the sufficiency of the payoff floor constraint. If we denote the
value of the auxiliary problem by V0, the sufficiency result implies that V0 ≤ Π∗. It remains to
prove the converse V0 ≥ Π∗. In words, we have to prove that there is no sequence of equilibria in
which the seller can achieve a higher profit in the limit as ∆ → 0, than in the optimal solution
to the auxiliary problem. This is shown in Subsection 5.3. Since we have only imposed necessary
conditions for equilibrium outcomes in the auxiliary problem, this result is intuitive.
21So far, we have not been able to rule out this possibility or to construct an example where a solution with this
feature is optimal. Therefore, the analysis of the revenue-maximizing auctions for the non-concave case remains
incomplete.
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5.1 Discrete Time Approximation of the Efficient Auction
In order to prove the existence of Coasian equilibria, we follow the approach of Ausubel and
Deneckere (1989), and consider a class of symmetric equilibria in which the strategy used by the
buyers has a Markov property.
Definition 1. An equilibrium (p, b) ∈ E(∆) is a weak-Markov equilibrium if the buyers’ strategies
only depend on the reserve price announced for the current period.
We first show the existence of weak-Markov equilibria. The proofs of this and the following
proposition follow closely the approach of Ausubel and Deneckere (1989). Therefore, we only sketch
the changes necessary to adapt their proofs to the model with multiple buyers. See Appendix B in
the Supplemental Material.
Proposition 5. If the type distribution satisfies Assumption A3, then a weak-Markov equilibrium
exists for every r > 0 and ∆ > 0.
Next, we show that weak-Markov equilibria satisfy the uniform Coase conjecture. In particular,
we show that in any weak-Markov equilibrium, the seller’s continuation profit conditional on vt
converges to ΠE(vt) as ∆ → 0 and the convergence is uniform over all vt ∈ [0, 1] and all weak-
Markov equilibria. In contrast to the case of one buyer analyzed by Ausubel and Deneckere (1989),
the first reserve price in a continuation game where the seller’s posterior is vt need not converge
to zero as ∆ → 0.22 Nevertheless, we obtain the Coase conjecture because prices fall arbitrarily
quickly as ∆→ 0. On the buyer side, the strategy is described by a cutoff for the reserve price. A
buyer places a bid if and only if the current reserve price is below the cutoff. The Markov property
of the buyer’s strategy implies that the cutoff only depends on the buyer’s type, it is independent
of time and of the history of previous reserve prices. As ∆ → 0, the cutoff of a buyer with type
v converges to the payment that this type would make in a second-price auction without reserve
price. Since this cutoff is bounded away from zero, and reserve prices decline arbitrarily quickly,
the delay of the allocation vanishes for all buyers as ∆→ 0. Therefore, the seller’s profit converges
to the profit of an efficient auction. More precisely, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (Uniform Coase Conjecture). Fix r > 0. If the type distribution satisfies Assump-
tion A3, then for every ε > 0, there exists a ∆ε > 0 such that for all ∆ < ∆ε and all x ∈ [0, 1] and
every weak-Markov equilibrium (p, b) of the game with period length ∆ and distribution F (v|v ≤ x),
the sellers profit Π∆(p, b|x) is bounded by (1 + ε)ΠE(x).
This proposition implies the following Corollary.
Corollary 2. If n > N(F ) and Assumption A3 is satisfied, then the optimal solution to the
auxiliary problem is the limit of a sequence of discrete time equilibria for ∆→ 0.
22For the uniform distribution, this was already noted by McAfee and Vincent (1997).
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Moreover, uniform convergence of the seller’s profit enables us to use weak-Markov equilibria as
punishments in the construction of equilibria that approximate the solution to the binding payoff
floor constraint.
5.2 Discrete Time Approximation of the Solution to the Binding Payoff Floor
Constraint
In order to construct equilibria that approximate the solution to the binding payoff floor constraint,
we proceed in three steps. First, we show that if the binding payoff floor constraint has a decreasing
solution, then there exists a nearby solution for which the payoff floor constraint is strictly slack. In
particular, we show that for each K > 1 sufficiently small, there exists a solution with a decreasing





t (x) = K Π
E(vt). (5.1)
For K = 1, (5.1) reduces to the original payoff floor constraint in (3.7) (divided by Ft(vt)). There-
fore, a decreasing solution that satisfies (5.1) for K > 1 is a feasible solution to the auxiliary
problem. Moreover, the slack in the original payoff floor constraint is proportional to ΠE(vt).
Lemma 8. Suppose n < N(F ). Then there exists Γ > 1 such that for all K ∈ [1,Γ], there exists
a feasible solution TK to the auxiliary problem that satisfies (5.1). For K ↘ 1, TK(v) converges
to T (v) for all v ∈ [0, 1], and the seller’s expected revenue converges to the value of the auxiliary
problem.
In the second step, we discretize the solution obtained in the first step so that all trades take
place at times t = 0,∆, 2∆, . . .. For given K and ∆, we define the discrete approximation TK,∆ of
TK by delaying all trades in the time interval (k∆, (k + 1)∆] to (k + 1)∆:
TK,∆(v) := ∆ min
{
k ∈ N ∣∣ k∆ ≥ TK(v)} . (5.2)
In other words, we round up all trading times to the next integer multiple of ∆. Clearly, for all









TK,∆(v) = T (v),
and the seller’s expected revenue also converges. Therefore, if we show that the functions TKm,∆m
for some sequence (Km,∆m) describe equilibrium outcomes for a sequence of equilibria (p
m, bm) ∈
E(∆m), we have obtained the desired approximation result.
The discretization changes the continuation revenue, but we can show that the approximation
loss vanishes as ∆ becomes small. In particular, if ∆ is sufficiently small, then the approximation
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loss is less than half of the slack in the payoff floor constraint at the solution TK . More precisely,
we have the following lemma.
Lemma 9. Suppose n < N(F ). For each K ∈ [1,Γ], where Γ satisfies the condition of Lemma 8,
there exists ∆¯1K such that for all ∆ < ∆¯
1










This lemma shows that if ∆ is sufficiently small, at each point in time t = 0,∆, 2∆, . . ., the
continuation payoff of the discretized solution is at least as high as 1 + (K − 1)/2 times the profit
of the efficient auction.
In the final step, we show that the discretized solution TK,∆ can be implemented in an equi-
librium of the discrete time game. To do this, we use weak-Markov equilibria as a threat to deter
any deviation from the equilibrium path by the seller. The threat is effective because the uniform
Coase conjecture implies that the profit of a weak-Markov equilibrium is close to the profit of an
efficient auction for any posterior along the equilibrium path. More precisely, let Π∆(p, b|v) be the
continuation profit at posterior v for a given equilibrium (p, b) ∈ E(∆) as before.23 Then Proposi-
tion 6 implies that for all K ∈ [1,Γ], where Γ satisfies the condition of Lemma 8, there exists ∆¯2K
such that, for all ∆ < ∆¯2K , there exists an equilibrium (p, b) ∈ E(∆) such that, for all v ∈ [0, 1],
Π∆(p, b|v) ≤ K + 1
2
ΠE(v).
This is the observation we will use when we invoke Proposition 6 in the following.







. We can construct a decreasing sequence ∆m ↘ 0 such that for all m, ∆m < ∆¯Km .
By Lemma 9 and Proposition 6, there exists a sequence of equilibria (pˆm, bˆm) ∈ E(∆m) such that




Km,∆m (x)−t)Jt(x)dF (n)(x) ≥ Km + 1
2
ΠE(vKm,∆mt ) ≥ Π(pˆm, bˆm|vKm,∆mt ). (5.3)
The first integral in this expression is the continuation profit at time t on the candidate equilibrium
path given by TKm,∆m . This is greater or equal than the second expression by Lemma 9. The
last integral is the continuation profit at time t if we switch to the punishment equilibrium. This
continuation profit is smaller than the second expression by Proposition 6. Therefore, for each m,
(pˆm, bˆm) can be used to support TKm,∆m as an equilibrium outcome of the game indexed by ∆m.
Denote the equilibrium that supports TKm,∆m by (pm, bm) ∈ E(∆m). It is defined as follows: On
23If the profit differs for different histories that lead to the same posterior, we could take the supremum, but this
complication does not arise with weak-Markov equilibria.
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the equilibrium path, the seller posts reserve prices given by TKm,∆m and (3.3). A buyer with type
v bids at time TKm,∆m(v) as long as the seller does not deviate. By Lemma 6, this is a best response
to the seller’s on-path behavior. After a deviation by the seller, she is punished by switching to
the equilibrium (pˆm, bˆm). Since the seller anticipates the switch to (pˆm, bˆm) after a deviation, her
deviation profit is bounded above by Π(pˆm, bˆm|vKm,∆mt ). Therefore, (5.3) implies that the seller
does not have a profitable deviation. To summarize, we have an approximation of the solution to
the binding payoff floor constraint by discrete time equilibrium outcomes.
Proposition 7. Suppose Assumption A3 is satisfied and n < N(F ). Then there exists a decreasing
sequence ∆m ↘ 0 and a sequence of equilibria (pm, bm) ∈ E(∆m) such that the sequence of trading
functions Tm implemented by (p
m, bm) and the seller’s ex-ante revenue Π∆(pm, bm) converge to the
solution given by (4.2), and the value of the auxiliary problem, respectively.
For the case that Assumption A4 is satisfied, Proposition 7 shows that the optimal solution to
the auxiliary problem is the limit of a sequence of discrete time equilibria for ∆→ 0. For the case
that Assumption A4 is not satisfied, we did not obtain an optimal solution to the auxiliary problem
from the binding payoff floor constraint. In this case, Proposition 7 shows that a feasible solution
to the auxiliary problem, which involves strictly positive reserve prices and yields a higher profit
than the efficient auction, can be obtained as the limit of a sequence of discrete time equilibria for
∆→ 0.
5.3 Optimality of the Solution to the Auxiliary Problem
Corollary 2 and Proposition 7 show that V0 ≤ Π∗ for all cases where we have characterized the
optimal solution of the auxiliary problem. Now we show the converse. In other words, we prove
that there are no better limiting outcomes and profits than the solution and value of the auxiliary
problem.
To obtain this result, we first define an ε-relaxed continuous time auxiliary problem. We replace





t (v) ≥ ΠE(vt)− ε.
By the maximum theorem, the value of this problem, which we denote by Vε, is continuous in ε.
Next, we formulate a discrete version of the auxiliary problem. For given ∆, the feasible set of
this problem is given by






k∆ (v) ≥ ΠE(vk∆) ∀k ∈ N.
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We denote the value of this problem by V (∆). The second constraint requires that in each period,
the seller’s continuation profit on the equilibrium path exceeds the revenue from an efficient auction
given the current posterior. This is a necessary condition for an equilibrium. Therefore, the seller’s
expected revenue in any equilibrium (p, b) ∈ E(∆) cannot exceed V (∆). Moreover, for given ε,
the feasible set of the discrete auxiliary problem is contained in the feasible set of the ε-relaxed
continuous time auxiliary problem if ∆ is sufficiently small. Formally, we have:
Lemma 10. Suppose Assumption A3 is satisfied. For all ε > 0, there exists ∆ε > 0 such that for
all ∆ < ∆ε we have
sup
(p,b)∈E(∆)
Π∆(p, b) ≤ V (∆) ≤ Vε.
Since the value of the relaxed auxiliary problem is continuous in ε and the left-hand side of
the inequality in Lemma 10 converges to Π∗, we have V0 ≥ Π∗ and hence we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 8. Suppose Assumption A3 is satisfied. If either n > N(F ), or n < N(F ) and
Assumption A4 holds, then V0 = Π
∗.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we study the role of commitment power in auctions where the seller cannot commit to
future reserve prices. Our analysis draws insights from the bargaining literature, and the auction
and mechanism design literature. For tractability, we make several simplifying assumptions. We
conclude the paper by discussing how to relax these assumptions and future research directions.
We restrict the mechanisms in each period to be standard auctions and we focus on buyer-
symmetric equilibria. These assumptions ensure that the posterior beliefs at any history are trun-
cations of the original distribution, which facilitates the analysis of the auxiliary mechanism design
problem. A more general version of the auxiliary problem can be formulated to allow for more
general trading rules and payment schemes. With this generalization, however, the payoff floor
constraints are less tractable a priori, because the posterior beliefs at arbitrary histories lack a
well-defined structure. We believe, however, that the auxiliary mechanism design approach, which
overcomes the failure of revelation principle, can be applied to analyze other problems with limited
commitment.
The restriction to buyer-symmetric equilibria has several consequences. It rules out the possi-
bility that different buyers have different cutoffs for bidding at a given history. Moreover, symmetry
rules out that buyers play dominated strategies in equilibrium if the seller uses second-price auc-
tions. This latter assumption is standard. Nevertheless, it is of theoretical interest to investigate
whether weakly dominated strategies can expand the payoff set of the seller. For instance, the
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second price auction has an asymmetric equilibrium in which the seller’s profit is equal to zero if
the reserve price is zero. Presumably, the seller would never choose a reserve price of zero if she
anticipates this bidding equilibrium, but it is no longer clear that the seller can guarantee the profit
of an efficient auction. Allowing for dominated strategies therefore makes the characterization of
the worst punishment equilibrium non-trivial. An understanding of the worst punishment, however,
is crucial for the formulation of the payoff floor constraint. In particular, a punishment equilib-
rium that reduces the seller’s profit to zero would allow us to construct an equilibrium in trigger
strategies in which the seller can get the full commitment profit. The possibility of a zero-profit
equilibrium in the auction setting seems unlikely, but we have not conducted an analysis that allows
for asymmetric and weakly dominated strategies and therefore leave this as a future exercise.
Our way of modeling limited commitment assumes that the seller can commit to the terms
of trade within a single period, no matter how small the period length is. This assumption is
consistent with the durable goods monopoly literature—the prime aim of which is to analyze the
role of commitment power in the bilateral trade environment. We believe this modeling approach
to limited commitment is intuitive, and the assumption is also realistic in many auction practices.
Another way to formulate the problem of non-commitment is to allow renegotiation. This
approach, which has been investigated in the dynamic contracting literature, is concerned with
continuing relationships between a principal and an agent. If the two parties trade repeatedly,
any private information revealed by the agent will be fully exploited by the principal in future
interactions. This leads to the familiar “ratchet effect” (see Freixas, Guesnerie, and Tirole, 1985).
The ratchet effect can be mitigated if the principal and the agent can enter a long-term contract that
protects the agent from exploitation even if the contract can be renegotiated (see Hart and Tirole,
1988; Dewatripont, 1989; Laffont and Tirole, 1990). Our model differs from this literature because
the sequential auction game ends with a sale as soon as some buyer actively reveals some private
information by placing a bid. Therefore, there is no ratchet effect. Moreover, in a model with
multiple bidders, modeling renegotiation introduces new conceptual issues, such as the protocol of
multiple-person bargaining and signaling in the renegotiation phase.
In the present paper, we take a step towards understanding the role of commitment power
in auctions. Our aim is to provide a deeper conceptual understanding of the economics behind
commitment, and to provide a useful methodology to handle limited-commitment problems. We
therefore chose the classic single-object environment initiated by Myerson (1981). In applications,
one might be interested in multiple-unit auctions as well as auctions with entry of new buyers.
These issues are interesting and of practical relevance. We believe our framework and methodology
will be useful to address these questions.
Dynamic auctions with limited commitment also open a whole set of new theoretical issues.
Many questions that have been studied for auctions with full commitment have their counterparts
in our framework with limited commitment. In particular, one interesting set of questions is how
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various market design details matter under limited commitment. For instance, one could consider
the role of secret reserve prices, where the auctioneer openly solicits bids without publicly announc-
ing a reserve price. In this environment, one would further ask whether the auctioneer can ever
commit to her privately set reserve prices. A more theoretical direction is to explore information
disclosure in auctions. A monopolistic seller, even though she lacks commitment power, has control
over information flows generated by the mechanism. Will this information be used strategically to
the seller’s interest? Would the ability to withhold information enforce or weaken the commitment
power? We leave these questions to future research.
A Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proofs for Section 2
Proof of Lemma 2. In the main paper we slightly abuse notation by using pt both for the seller’s
(possibly mixed) strategy and the announced reserve price at a given history. This should not lead
to confusion in the main part but for this proof we make a formal distinction. We denote the reserve
price announced in period t by xt. A history is therefore given by ht = (x0, . . . , xt−∆). Furthermore
we denote by ht+ = (ht, xt) = (x0, . . . , xt−∆, xt) a history in which the reserve prices x0, . . . , xt−∆
have been announced in periods t = 0, . . . , t − ∆ but no buyer has bid in these periods, and the
seller has announced xt in period t, but buyers have not yet decided whether they bid or not. For
any two histories ht = (x0, x∆, ..., xt−∆) and h′s = (x′0, x′∆, ..., x
′
s−∆), with s ≤ t, we define a new
history
ht ⊕ h′s = (x′0, x′∆, ..., x′s−∆, xs, ..., xt−∆).
That is, ht ⊕ h′s is obtained by replacing the initial period s subhistory in ht with h′s. Finally, we
can similarly define ht+ ⊕ h′s for s < t. With this notation we can state the proof of the lemma.
Consider any equilibrium (p, b) ∈ E(∆) in which the seller randomizes on the equilibrium path.
The idea of the proof is that we can inductively replace randomization on the equilibrium path by
a deterministic reserve price and at the same time weakly increase the sellers ex-ante revenue. We
first construct an equilibrium (p0, b0) ∈ E(∆) in which the seller earns the same expected profit
as in (p, b), but does not randomize at t = 0. If the seller uses a pure action at t = 0, we can
set (p0, b0) = (p, b). Otherwise, if the seller randomizes over several prices at t = 0, she must
be indifferent between all prices in the support of p0(h0). Therefore, we can define p
0
0(h0) as the
distribution that puts probability one on a single price x0 ∈ supp p0(h0). If we leave the seller’s
strategy unchanged for all other histories (p0t (ht) = pt(ht), for all t > 0 and all ht ∈ Ht) and set
b0 = b, we have defined an equilibrium (p0, b0) that gives the seller the same payoff as (p, b) and
specifies a pure action for the seller at t = 0.
Next we proceed inductively. Suppose we have already constructed an equilibrium (pm, bm) in
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which the seller does not randomize on the equilibrium path up to t = m∆, but uses a mixed action
on the equilibrium path at (m + 1)∆. We want to construct an equilibrium (pm+1, bm+1) with a
pure action for the seller on the equilibrium path at (m + 1)∆. Suppose that in the equilibrium
equilibrium (pm, bm), the highest type in the posterior at (m + 1)∆ is some type β0(m+1)∆ > 0.
We select a price in the support of the seller’s mixed action at (m + 1)∆, which we denote by
x0(m+1)∆, such that the expected payoff of β
0
(m+1)∆ at ht+ = (ht, x
0
(m+1)∆) is weakly smaller than
the expected payoff at ht. In other words, we pick a price that is (weakly) bad news for the buyer
with type β0(m+1)∆. This will be the equilibrium price announced in period t = (m + 1)∆ in the
equilibrium (pm+1, bm+1). The formal construction of the equilibrium is rather complicated. The
rough idea is that, first we posit that after x0(m+1)∆ was announced in period (m+1)∆, (p
m+1, bm+1)
prescribes the same continuation as (pm, bm). Second, on the equilibrium path up to period m∆,
we change the reserve prices such that the same marginal types as before are indifferent between
buying immediately and waiting in all periods t = 0, . . . ,m∆. Since we have chosen x0(m+1)∆ to
be bad news, this leads to (weakly) higher prices for t = 0, . . . ,m∆, and therefore we can show
that the seller’s expected profit increases weakly. Finally, we have to specify what happens after a
deviation from the equilibrium path by the seller in periods t = 0, . . . , (m+ 1)∆. Consider the on-
equilibrium history ht in period t for (p
m+1, bm+1). We identify a history hˆt for which the posterior
in the original equilibrium (p, b) is the same posterior as at ht in the new equilibrium. If at ht,
the seller deviates from pm+1 by announcing the reserve price xˆt, than we define (p
m+1, bm+1) after
ht+ = (ht, xˆt) using the strategy prescribed by (p, b) for the subgame starting at hˆt+ = (hˆt+ , xˆt).
We will show that with this definition, the seller does not have an incentive to deviate.
Next, we formally construct the sequence of equilibria (pm, bm) , m = 1, 2, ..., and show that
this sequence converges to an equilibrium (p∞, b∞) in which the seller never randomizes on the
equilibrium path and achieves an expected revenue at least as high as the expected revenue in

















that specify the seller’s






.24 Then we construct an equilibrium (pm, bm) such
that the following properties hold: for t = 0, ...,m∆, the equilibrium prices xmt chosen by the seller
are weakly higher than x0t and the equilibrium cutoffs β
m
t are exactly β
0
t ; for t > m∆, or off the




prescribes at some properly identified
histories, so that the two strategy profiles prescribe the same continuation payoffs at their respective
histories.












we start at t = 0 and define x00 as
the seller’s pure action in period zero in the equilibrium (p0, b0) and set β00 = 1. Next we proceed
inductively. Suppose we have fixed x0t and β
0
t for t = 0,∆, . . .. To define x
0
t+∆, we select a price
24Note that the cutoffs β0t are the equilibrium cutoffs which may be different from the cutoffs that would arise if
the seller used pure actions with prices x00, x
0
∆, ... on the equilibrium path.
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in the equilibrium (p0, b0)
such that the expected payoff of the cutoff buyer type β0t , conditional on x
0
t+∆ is announces, is no
larger than this type’s expected payoff at the beginning of period t + ∆ before a reserve price is













for m = 0, 1, . . . as follows.
(1) On the equilibrium path at t = (m+ 1) ∆, the seller plays a pure action and announces the
reserve price xm+1(m+1)∆ := x
0
(m+1)∆.
(2) On the equilibrium path at t = 0,∆, ...,m∆, the seller’s pure action xm+1t is chosen such that
the buyers’ on-path cutoff types in periods t = ∆, ..., (m+ 1) ∆ is βm+1t = β
0




(3) On the equilibrium path at the history ht+ = (x0, . . . , xt) for t = 0,∆, (m+ 1) ∆, each buyer
bids if and only if vi ≥ βm+1t = β0t .
(4) at t > (m+ 1) ∆ : for any history ht = (x0, ..., xt−∆) in which no deviation has occurred at or










any history ht+ = (x0, ..., xt−∆, xt) in which no deviation has occurred at or before (m+ 1) ∆,










(5) For any off-path history ht = (x0, ..., xt−∆) in which the seller’s first deviation from the equi-









. For any off-path history ht+ = (x0, ..., xt−∆, xt) in which the seller’s
first deviation from the equilibrium path occurs in period s ≤ (m+ 1) ∆, the buyer’s strategy










In this definition, (1) and (2) define the seller’s pure actions on the equilibrium path up to (m+ 1) ∆.
The prices defined in (1) and (2) are chosen such that bidding according to the cutoffs βm+1t is
optimal for the buyers. Part (4) defines the equilibrium strategies for all remaining on-path histories
and after deviations that occur in periods after (m + 1)∆, that is, in periods where the seller can
still mix on the equilibrium path. The equilibrium proceeds as in (p0, b0) at the history where the
seller used the prices x00, ..., x
0
(m+1)∆ in the first m+ 1 periods. This ensures that the continuation
strategy profile is taken from the continuation of an on-path history of the equilibrium (p0, b0),
where the seller’s posterior in period (m + 1)∆ is the same as in the equilibrium (pm+1, bm+1).
Finally, (5) defines the continuation after a deviation by the seller at a period in which we have
25If the seller plays a pure action at h0t+∆, than x
0
t+∆ the price prescribed with probability one by the pure action.
If the seller randomizes at h0t+∆, there must be one realization, which, together with the continuation following it,
gives the buyer a payoff weakly smaller than the average.
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already defined a pure action. If the seller deviates at a history ht =
(




, then we use







We proceed by proving a series of claims showing that we have indeed constructed an equilib-
rium.
Claim 1. The expected payoff of the cutoff buyer βm(m+1)∆ = β
0
(m+1)∆ at the on-path history
hm(m+1)∆ = (x
m
0 , ..., x
m
m∆) in the candidate equilibrium (p
m, bm) is the same as its payoff at the











Proof. This follows immediately from (1)–(3) above.
Claim 2. The expected payoff of the cutoff buyer βm+1(m+1)∆ = β
0
































Proof. By construction, xm+1(m+1)∆ = x
0








are identical on the equilibrium path from period (m+ 2) ∆ onwards. The claim follows.
Claim 3. The expected payoff of the cutoff buyer βm+1(m+1)∆ = β
0
(m+1)∆ at the on-path history
hm+1(m+1)∆ =
(








is weakly lower than this














, the cutoff type’s payoffs at histories hm+1(m+1)∆
and hm+1
((m+1)∆)+





, the cutoff type’s payoff at history hm+1
((m+1)∆)+
is weakly lower than his payoff
at history h0(m+1)∆ because of the definition of x
0
(m+1)∆ (which chosen to give the cutoff type a
lower expected payoff than the expected payoff at h0(m+1)∆). The claim then follows from Claim
2.
Claim 4. The expected payoff of the cutoff buyer βm+1(m+1)∆ = β
0
(m+1)∆ at the on-path history
hm+1(m+1)∆ =
(








is weakly lower than this
cutoff type’s expected payoff at the on-path history hm(m+1)∆ = (x
m
0 , ..., x
m
m∆) in the candidate equi-
librium (pm, bm) .
Proof. By Claim 1, the cutoff type’s expected payoff at the on-path history hm(m+1)∆ = (x
m
0 , ..., x
m
m∆)









. The claim then follows from Claim 3.
Claim 5. For each m = 0, 1, ... and t = 0, 1, ...,m∆, we have xm+1t ≥ xmt .
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(m+1)∆ in period (m+ 1) ∆ on the




has a weakly lower payoff than its
expected payoff in the candidate equilibrium (pm, bm) . To keep this cutoff indifferent in period m∆
in both candidate equilibria, we must have xm+1m∆ ≥ xmm∆. Then to keep the cutoff type βm+1m∆ =
βmm∆ = β
0
m∆ indifferent in period (m− 1) ∆, we must have xm+1(m−1)∆ ≥ xm(m−1)∆. The proof is then
completed by induction.














and (pm, bm) have the





xm+1(m+1)∆ that is in the support of the seller’s strategy in (p
m, bm) in that period (note that even
though we haven’t show that (pm, bm) is an equilibrium, the seller is indeed indifferent in (pm, bm)




with identical continuation payoffs by Part (4)
of the construction). It then follows from Claim 5 that the seller’s (time 0) expected payoff in(
pm+1, bm+1
)
is weakly higher than the seller’s (time 0) expected payoff in (pm, bm) . The claim is
proved by repeating this argument.
Claim 7. For t = ∆, ..., (m+1)∆, the seller’s expected payoff at the on-path history
(



















Proof. Denote mt = t/∆ so that t = mt∆ and consider (p
mt , bmt) . By parts (1)–(3) of the construc-
tion, the buyer’s cutoff type at
(















. By part (4) of the construction, the seller’s payoff
at history
(























. By claim 5,
(
xmt+10 , ..., x
mt+1
t−∆





further differs from the equilibrium (pmt , bmt) on the equilibrium path in
period t+∆. But xmt+1t is in the support of the seller’s randomization in (p
mt , bmt) (which makes the
seller indifferent by part (4) of the equilibrium construction — see the proof in Claim 6). Therefore,
the seller’s payoff at
(








is weakly greater than at(








. This completes the proof of the claim.




such constructed is indeed an equilibrium.
Proof. The buyer’s optimality condition follows immediately from the construction. Now consider
the seller. By part (5) of the construction, for any off-path history ht = (x0, ..., xt−∆) in which the

















with exactly the same expected payoff (the payoff is the same due to the fact















). Hence there is no profitable deviation at ht in(
pm+1, bm+1
)











By part (4) of the construction, at t > (m+ 1) ∆, for any history ht = (x0, ..., xt−∆) in which no





with the seller’s strategy at ht⊕
(




, with exactly the same continuation payoffs (see





Now consider parts (1)–(3) of the construction, for t = 0, ..., (m+ 1) ∆. By Claim 6 and 7,
staying on the equilibrium path gives the seller a weakly higher payoff than that from the equilibrium(
p0, b0
)
at the corresponding history. But deviation from the equilibrium path triggers a switch to(
p0, b0
)









. This completes the proof of the claim.
So far, we have obtained a sequence of equilibria {(pm, bm)}∞m=0 . Denote the limit of this se-
quence by (p∞, b∞). It is easy to check that the limit is well-defined. It remains to show that
(p∞, b∞) is an equilibrium. It is clear that buyers do not have an incentive to deviate. For the
seller, suppose the seller has a profitable deviation at some history hm∆. By the definition of
(p∞, b∞) and the construction of the sequence {(pm, bm)}∞m=0 , the continuation play at ht in the
candidate equilibrium (p∞, b∞) , where ht is a history with hm∆ as its subhistory, will coincide
























































and (p∞, b∞). This contradicts the assumption of profitable deviation.
Proof of Lemma 3. Fix a history ht. Note that if all buyers bid, then by the standard argument, it
is optimal for each bidder to bid their true values. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that each buyer
will submit a bid. By Lemma 1, we only need to show βt(ht, pt) = 0. Suppose by contradiction
that βt(ht, pt) > 0. Consider a positive type βt(ht, pt)− ε, where ε > 0. By Lemma 1, if this type
follows the equilibrium strategy and waits, he wins only if his opponents all have types lower than
βt(ht, pt) − ε, and he can only win in period t + ∆ or later at a price no smaller than 0. If he
deviates and bids his true value in period t, it follows from Lemma 1 that he wins in period t at a
price 0 if all of his opponents have types lower than βt(ht, pt). Therefore, the deviation is strictly
profitable for type βt(ht, pt)− ε, contradicting the definition of βt(ht, pt).
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A.2 Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Lemma 4. By Restrictions 1 and 4, the discounted trading time of buyer i only depends
on vi and v(n). If vi < v(n) we have qi(vi, v−i) = 0. Otherwise, Restriction 3 implies that
e−rτ
i(vi,v−i) = e−rT(v
(n))for some function T which is independent of i by symmetry (Restric-
tion 2). This observation, together with Restriction 1 and the random tie-breaking rule, implies





j : vj = v(n)
} .
Restriction 5 implies that T is non-increasing.
Proof of Lemma 5. It is sufficient to show that we can find a payment rule pi, together with τ as
defined in the Lemma, is incentive compatible. First, τ i(vi, v−i) = 1{vi=v(n)}T (v
i), implies that the









i), which is non-decreasing if T




































































is incentive compatible, and thus (τ, pi) is incentive compatible.
Proof of Lemma 6. Consider first periods t when at least one type trades, that is, t ∈ T ([0, 1]). If











































e−rT (v) (F (v))n−1 dv,
which can be rearranged to (3.3). For t /∈ T ([0, 1]), we can set pt = pt where t = inf{s | (s, t]∩T = ∅}
is the latest time s before t for which we have already defined ps. Since v
+
t is constant on [t, t] this
yields (3.3) again.


































We want to argue it implies IC constraints for any future period t > 0. To see this, consider vi and
































) |v(n) ≤ vt] vi − Ev−i [qi (vi, v−i)pii (vi, v−i) |v(n) ≤ vt]}Pr(v(n) ≤ vt) ,
and an analogous equation holds for vˆi. Therefore, the IC constraint at time 0 implies (3.6).
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose by contradiction that, T is feasible but T (v) = ∞ for some v > 0.
Since T is non-increasing, there exists w ∈ (0, 1) such that T (v) =∞ for all v ∈ [0, w) and T (v) <∞




Since T (v) < ∞ for all v ∈ (w, 1], we have vt → w as t → ∞. Hence, as t → ∞, the limit of the









e−r(T (x)−t)Jt(x)dF (n)(x) = 0.










x− F (w)− F (x)
f(x)
)
dF (n)(x) > 0.
Therefore, the payoff floor constraint must be violated for sufficiently large t, which contradicts the
feasibility of T .
Proof of Proposition 1. Let δ(v) := e−rT (v) denote the discount factor for type v who trades at time
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δ(v) J(v) f (n)(v) dv
s.t. δ(v) ∈ [0, 1], and non-decreasing,
∀v ∈ [0, 1] :
ˆ v
0
δ(s) J(s|s ≤ v) f (n)(s) ds ≥ δ(v+)
ˆ v
0
J(s|s ≤ v) f (n)(s) ds.
Let p¯i be the supremum of this maximization problem and let (δk) be a sequence of feasible solutions






(n)(v) dv = p¯i.
By Helly’s selection theorem, there is a subsequence (δk`), and a non-decreasing function δ¯ : [0, 1]→
[0, 1] such that δk`(v)→ δ¯(v) for all points of continuity of δ¯. Hence (after selecting a subsequence),
we can take (δk) to be almost everywhere convergent with a.e.-limit δ¯. By Lebesgue’s dominated
convergence theorem, we also have convergence w.r.t. the L2-norm and hence weak convergence in
L2. Therefore ˆ 1
0





(n)(v) dv = p¯i.
It remains to show that δ¯ satisfies the payoff floor constraint. Suppose not. Then there exists
vˆ ∈ [0, 1) such that
ˆ vˆ
0
δ¯(s) J(s|s ≤ vˆ) f (n)(s) ds < δ¯(vˆ+)
ˆ vˆ
0
J(s|s ≤ vˆ) f (n)(s) ds.
Then there also exists v ≥ vˆ such that δ¯ is continuous at v, and
ˆ v
0
δ¯(s) J(s|s ≤ v) f (n)(s) ds < δ¯(v)
ˆ v
0





J(s|s ≤ v) f (n)(s) ds−
ˆ v
0
δ¯(s) J(s|s ≤ v) f (n)(s) ds.
Since v is a point of continuity we have δ¯(v) = limk→∞ δk(v). Therefore, there exists kv such that
for all k > kv, ∣∣∣∣δ¯(v) ˆ v
0
J(s|s ≤ v) f (n)(s) ds− δk(v)
ˆ v
0
J(s|s ≤ v) f (n)(s) ds
∣∣∣∣ < S2 ,
and furthermore, since δk → δ¯ weakly in L2, we can choose kv such for all k > kv also∣∣∣∣ˆ v
0
δ¯(s) J(s|s ≤ v) f (n)(s) ds−
ˆ v
0
δk(s) J(s|s ≤ v) f (n)(s) ds
∣∣∣∣ < S2 .
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Together, this implies that for all k > kv,
ˆ v
0
δk(s) J(s|s ≤ v) f (n)(s) ds < δk(v)
ˆ v
0
J(s|s ≤ v) f (n)(s) ds,
which contradicts the assumption that δk is an feasible solution of the reformulated auxiliary prob-
lem defined above.
Proof of Proposition 2. By definition, rT = rˆTˆ , so the values of the objective functions under r
and rˆ are the same:
ˆ 1
0




Furthermore, Tˆ is non-increasing. It remains to show that Tˆ satisfies the payoff floor under rˆ. Let
vt and vˆt be the cutoff paths corresponding to T and Tˆ , respectively. By defining γ := r/rˆ, we have
vt = sup{v|T (v) ≥ t} = sup{v|Tˆ (v) ≥ γt} = vˆγt.
Therefore,
Jt(v) = v − F (vt)− F (v)
f(v)
= v − F (vˆγt)− F (v)
f(v)
= Jˆγt(v).
By inserting this into the payoff floor constraint at t with r and using rT = rˆTˆ again, we obtain
ˆ vˆγt
0





or equivalently, ˆ vˆs
0





Hence Tˆ satisfies the payoff floor constraint under rˆ for all s = γt.
A.3 Proofs for Section 4
Before proving Proposition 3, we first establish a lemma. We consider solutions where a strictly
positive measure of types trade at the same time t so that vt > v
+
t . In other words, there is an
“atom” of types that trade at t. The following lemma shows that if the payoff floor constraint is
satisfied right after the atom, then the payoff floor constraint at t (right before the atom) is strictly
slack. Moreover, if we reduce the size of the atom by lowering vt to v ∈ (v+t , vt) so that some types
in the atom trade earlier than t, the payoff floor constraint at t remains strictly slack for all choices
v ∈ (v+t , vt). This lemma is more general than needed for the proof of Proposition 3. The extra
generality will be used later.
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Lemma 11. Let T : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be non-increasing (not necessarily feasible) and denote the
corresponding cutoff sequence by vt. Suppose there is an “atom” at t ≥ 0, that is, vt > v+t . If the




































In particular, the payoff floor constraint is satisfied at t.






























































where the equality follows because all types in (v+t , v] trade at time t, and the inequality follows






























F (v)− F (v+t )
f(x)
)












F (v)− F (v+t )
f(x)
)
dF (n)(x) > 0.
Since T (x) > t for x < v+t and F (v) − F (v+t ) > 0 for v > v+t , the last inequality holds and the
proof is complete.
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Proof of Proposition 3. The “if” part is trivial. For the “only if” part, suppose there is another fea-
sible solution T˜ other than the efficient auction T ≡ 0. Let v˜t denote the cutoff path corresponding
to T˜ . Note first that the range of T˜ cannot be a singleton because this would imply that T˜ (v) = t





which is strictly lower than the revenue from an efficient auction at time 0. Therefore, the payoff
floor constraint is violated at t = 0, contradicting the feasibility of T˜ . Hence, we can assume that
there exists some time s such that T˜ (v) < s for all v > v˜s and T˜ (v) > s for all v < v˜s. Then we
can define a new feasible solution
Tˆ (v) :=
0 if v < v˜s,T˜ (v)− s if v ≥ v˜s,
with corresponding cutoff path vˆt. Solution Tˆ is feasible because T˜ satisfies the payoff floor con-
straint for all t ≥ s. Moreover, we must have 0 < vˆ+0 < 1. We can invoke Lemma 11 by setting
t = 0 and v = v0 = 1 to obtain
ˆ 1
0




The left hand side of the above inequality is the revenue from Tˆ , while the right hand side is the
revenue from T ≡ 0. This completes the proof.
Proof of Remark 1. We first show that every distribution with well-defined φ must have φ ≥ −1.
Suppose by contradiction that φ < −1. Then there exists ε > 0 such that, for all v ∈ (0, ε],











which is equivalent to f(x) ≥ f(ε)ε/x. But this implies that the distribution function F is not










Therefore, we must have φ ≥ −1. The same argument can used to show that φ 6= −1 if f ′(v)v/f (v)
is independent of v for all v ∈ (0, ε] for some ε > 0.
Next we prove Theorems 2 and 3. As outlined in the main text, their proofs are closely connected
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and several preliminary lemmas are used in both proofs. We start by considering solutions to the
binding payoff floor constraint. We will show that the binding payoff floor constraint can be reduced
to an ODE which will give us a candidate solution. This candidate solution, represented by a cutoff
path, may not decrease over time, so it may not be feasible. The next step is to check when the
candidate solution is feasible, which is then used to prove part (i) of Theorem 2. The last step
shows that the payoff floor constraint must bind at the optimal solution if the cutoff vt is in a range
where the monopoly profit v(1− F (v)) is concave. Since this is always true for v sufficiently close
to zero, we can prove part (ii) of Theorem 2 without appealing to Assumption A4. For Theorem
3, we need that the payoff floor constraint binds everywhere which is true if Assumption A4 is
satisfied. Figure A.1 gives a graphical overview of the various lemmas and how they are used in
the proofs of these two theorems.
A.3.1 Step 1: Construct a Solution to the Binding Payoff Floor Constraint
The (binding) payoff floor constraint we will study here will be more general than needed to prove
Theorems 2 and 3. The extra generality is important for our later analysis in Section 5 where we
use equilibria of discrete time games to approximate the solution to the auxiliary problem. Our
discrete approximation requires feasible solutions for which the payoff floor constraint is strictly
slack, that is, for all t ≥ 0,
ˆ vt
0





where K ∈ [1,Γ] with some Γ > 0. We will refer constraint (A.3) as the generalized (binding) payoff
floor constraint. Note that our earlier binding payoff floor constraint is a special case with K = 1.
The following lemma shows that the generalized payoff floor constraint (A.3) can be reduced to an
ODE. For K = 1, this ODE reduces to (4.1).
We assume for now that the solutions T and vt for which the generalized payoff floor constraint
is binding are continuously differentiable. We will show later in Lemma 13 that this differentiability
property holds for every solution for which the payoff floor is binding.
Lemma 12. Suppose T (x) satisfies (A.3) for all t ∈ (a, b) and suppose T is continuously differen-
tiable with −∞ < T ′(v) < 0 for all v ∈ (vb, va) and vt is continuously differentiable for all t ∈ (a, b).
Then vt is twice continuously differentiable on (a, b) and is characterized by
v¨t
v˙t
+ g(vt,K)v˙t + h(vt,K) (v˙t)












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fn−2 (vt) f2 (vt) vt´ vt
0 [F (vt)− F (v)]Fn−2 (v) f (v) vdv
.
Proof. We first rewrite (A.3) as
ˆ vt
0









































Since T is continuous and has a bounded derivative, v˙t > 0. By assumption, f(vt) > 0, so we can






















This equation, together with our assumption that f(v) is continuously differentiable, implies that














































where we have used ∂
2Jt(x)
∂t2









































= −re−rtnFn−1(vt)vt + e−rtn(n− 1)Fn−2(vt)f(vt)vtv˙t + e−rtnFn−1(vt)v˙t.
Therefore, differentiating (A.4) on both sides yields
e−rtnFn−1(vt)v˙t
=Kre−rt



















+ (K − 1)re−rtnFn−1(vt)vt − (K − 1)e−rtn(n− 1)Fn−2(vt)f(vt)vtv˙t − (K − 1)e−rtnFn−1(vt)v˙t.
This can be simplified into
0 =Kr


















dF (n)(x) + (K − 1)rnFn−1(vt)vt − (K − 1)n(n− 1)Fn−2(vt)f(vt)vtv˙t.

























dF (n)(x)f (vt) v˙t
+ (K − 1)rnFn−1(vt)f (vt) v˙tvt − (K − 1)n(n− 1)Fn−2(vt) (f(vt))2 vt (v˙t)2 .


















dx f (vt) v˙t
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Fn−2 (vt) f2 (vt) vt´ vt
0 [F (vt)− F (v)]Fn−2 (v) f (v) vdv
.
Next we show that, if the payoff floor is binding for T and vt, then they must be continuously
differentiable. Therefore, the differentiability assumption in Lemma 12 is not necessary. This result
will only be used for the original binding payoff floor constraint, for which we want to show that the
solution to the ODE is the only solution to the binding payoff floor constraint. For the generalized
payoff floor constraint we will not need a uniqueness result.
Lemma 13. Let T be a feasible solution for which (3.7) holds with equality for all t > 0. Then
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(i) T is strictly decreasing for v ∈ [0, v+0 ].
(ii) T is continuously differentiable with T ′(v) < 0 for all v ∈ (0, v+0 ).
(iii) vt is twice continuously differentiable for all t > 0 where vt > 0.
Proof. Note that part (i) and part (ii) imply that vt is continuously differentiable for all t > 0 where
vt > 0. Part (iii) then follows from Lemma 12.
To prove (i) and (ii), we proceed in several steps. First, we show that T is strictly decreasing
except for a possible interval [0, va] with a <∞, where T is constant and equal to a. Suppose not.
Then there exists a trading time s such that T−1(s) = (w, vs] where w < vs. Since the payoff floor




































































































This expression can only hold if w = 0.
Next, we show that T is continuous. Suppose not. Then there exists a time interval (a, b) such


























where the second line follows from the binding payoff floor constraint at b, and the last line follows
from the fact that v+a = vb and Ja (x) = Jb (x). But the last line contradicts the assumption that
the payoff floor constraint is satisfied at a+. Therefore, T is continuous.
Third, we show that T is continuously differentiable on (va, v
+
0 ). Since T is continuous and
strictly decreasing for v ∈ (va, v+0 ), a binding payoff floor constraint for all t ∈ (0, a) is equivalent





x− F (v)− F (x)
f(x)
)
























Continuity of T and continuous differentiability of F imply that the left-hand side of this expression
is continuously differentiable, and thus T is also continuously differentiable. For the derivative we
obtain
re−rT (v)T ′(v) =
e−rT (v)f (n)(v)v − ´ v0 e−rT (x) f(v)f(x) dF (n)(x)´ v
0
(



















⇐⇒ re−rT (v)T ′(v) =
e−rT (v)
[




































































































−r(T (x)−T (v)) 1
f(x) dF



















e−r(T (x)−T (v)) − 1) 1f(x) dF (n)(x)´ v
0
(




where the second equality follows from the binding payoff floor constraint. In the last line, the
numerator is strictly negative and the denominator is positive. Therefore T ′(v) < 0. This shows
part (ii) for v ∈ (a, v+0 ).
To complete the proof for part (i) and the remaining case of part (ii), it suffices to show that
a = 0. Suppose not. Then there exists a < ∞ such that T (v) = a for all v ∈ [0, va]. Our results
obtained above imply that vt is continuously differentiable for t ∈ (0, a) since T is continuously
differentiable, strictly decreasing, and finite on (va, v
+
0 ). It follows from Lemma 12 that
v¨t
v˙t
+ g(vt)v˙t + r = 0.
Using the change of variables y = v˙t we have
y′(v) + g(v)y(v) + r = 0.
The solution to the differential equation is














where C is the integration constant. Since f is continuous and f(v) > 0, g(v) is bounded on [ε, 1−ε]
for every ε > 0. Therefore, we have
lim
v↘va
y(v) = C. (A.5)
To reach a contradiction, we differentiate the binding payoff floor constraint as in the proof of



































This contradicts the fact that the payoff floor constraint binds at t = a. Hence, a = 0.
A.3.2 Step 2: Check Feasibility of the Constructed Solution
If the ODE in (4.1) admits a decreasing solution (v˙t ≤ 0, ∀t), then the binding payoff floor constraint
yields non-trivial feasible solution to the auxiliary problem. It turns out that the existence of such
a solution depends on the behavior of g(v)v for v → 0. We denote this limit by κ. The following
lemma gives an explicit expression for this constant. Again we prove a more general result that
will be used in the discrete time approximation.
Lemma 14. If Assumption A2 is satisfied, we have
κ := lim
v→0
g(v)v = φ− ((n− 1)φ+ n− 2) (nφ+ n+ 1)
(n− 1) (1 + φ) , (A.6)
lim
v→0
g(v,K)v = κ− K − 1
K
(
nφ+ n+ 2 +
φ+ 2











(n+ φn+ 1)(n+ φn− φ). (A.8)
Proof. We define the following functions:
X(v) :=
Fn−1(v)f(v)v






(n− 1) ´ v0 [F (v)− F (s)]Fn−2 (s) f (s) sds.
With these definitions we have
g(v) = g(v, 1) =
f ′ (v)
f (v)
−X(v) + Y (v),
and
g(v,K) = g(v)− (K − 1)
K
X(v).







f ′(v)v + f (v)
f(v)









which will be used repeatedly below.
We now show that
lim
v→0
X(v)v = nφ+ n+ 2 +
φ+ 2
(n− 1) (1 + φ)
lim
v→0
Y (v) v = 2 +
2 (φ+ 2)
(n− 1) (1 + φ) .






(n− 1)Fn−2(v)f2(v)v2 + Fn−1(v)f ′(v)v2 + Fn−1(v)f(v)2v
























(n− 1)f (v) ´ v0 s Fn−2(s)f(s) ds + limv→0
Fn−1(v)2v
(n− 1) ´ v0 s Fn−2(s)f(s) ds,
where we have used l’Hospital’s rule in the first step and then rearranged the expression. The limit























= (n− 2) (φ+ 1) + φ+ 2
= (n− 1)φ+ n,
















(n− 1) ´ v0 s Fn−2(s)f(s) ds
= φ lim
v→0




















(n− 1) ´ v0 s Fn−2(s)f(s) ds = limv→0





















We can put the three limits together to obtain the desired result.
lim
v→0
















= nφ+ n+ 2 +
φ+ 2
(n− 1) (1 + φ) .
For the limit of Y (v)v we have
lim
v→0












n−1 (s) ds+ vf ′ (v)
´ v
0 F
n−1 (s) ds+ vf (v)Fn−1 (v)






































(n− 1)vf(v) + φ limv→0
F (v)
(n− 1)vf(v) + limv→0
F (v)
(n− 1)vf(v) + 1
}
























nφ+ n+ 2 +
φ+ 2










= φ− ((n− 1)φ+ n− 2) (nφ+ n+ 1)
(n− 1) (1 + φ) ,
and hence we have (A.6) and (A.7).

































































= (n− 2) lim
v→0
(n− 3)Fn−4(v)f3(v)v3 + Fn−3(v)2f(v)f ′3 + Fn−3(v)f2(v)3v2
v Fn−2(v)f(v)
= (n− 2) lim
v→0
(n− 3)f2(v)v2 + F (v)2f ′2 + F (v)f(v)3v
F 2(v)
























= (n− 2)(1 + φ) ((n− 3)(1 + φ) + 2φ+ 3)
= (n+ φn− 2− 2φ)(n+ φn− φ).
































= (n− 2)(1 + φ) + φ+ 2







(n+ φn− 2− 2φ)(n+ φn− φ) + K − 1
K




(n+ φn+ 1)(n+ φn− φ).
With this notation, we can give a sufficient condition for the existence of a feasible solution to the
ODE in (4.1), and we can also provide a sufficient condition under which such a feasible solution
does not exist. It turns out that these two sufficient conditions are almost mutually exclusive,
depending on whether κ = limv→0 g(v)v is above or below −1.
Lemma 15. (i) If κ < −1, there exists no decreasing solution to (4.1).
(ii) If κ > −1, there exists a decreasing solution to (4.1).
(iii) Among all such solutions (4.2) maximizes the seller’s revenue for a given boundary value v+0 .
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 13, we apply the change of variables v˙t = y and consider the
equation
y′(v) + g(v)y(v) + r = 0.
The general solution is given by












where m > 0.26 Feasibility requires that y(v) < 0 for all v ∈ (0, v+0 ).
(i) Suppose κ < −1. Since κ = limv→0 g(v)v, there must exist γ > 0 such that g(v) ≤ − 1v for
all v ∈ (0, γ]. Then there does not exist a finite C such that the general solution in (A.9) satisfies
y(v) < 0 for all v ∈ (0, v+0 ). Suppose the opposite is true. Then there must exist a finite C such







26For m = 0, the solution candidate is not well defined for all κ because the first integral evaluates to ∞.
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m g(x)dxdw > −∞. (A.10)




































A contradiction. This shows part (i).







and show that the resulting solution













is negative and finite for all v. It is clear that y (v) < 0, so it suffices to rule out y (v) = −∞. Since
κ = limv→0 g(v)v > −1, there exist κˆ > −1 and γ > 0 such that g(v) ≥ κˆv for all v ∈ (0, γ]. Hence









































Therefore, y (v) is finite and y(v) < 0 for all v. Next we have to show that (A.12) can be integrated
to obtain a feasible solution of the auxiliary problem. It suffices to verify that the following boundary
condition
lim
t→∞ vt = 0, (A.13)
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We first show that, for any v+0 ∈ [0, 1], the solution to this differential equation satisfies (A.13).
Since the term in the parentheses is strictly positive we have
e
´ vt
















m g(x)dxdv = −rt.








m g(x)dxdv = −∞
which is possible only if limt→∞ vt = 0. Therefore, we have found a solution that satisfies the
boundary condition and is decreasing for all starting values v+0 . This concludes the proof for part
(ii).
To prove part (iii), it suffices to rule out the possibility that other solutions may yield a higher
value of the objective function. In light of (A.10), any decreasing solution must satisfy (A.9) with





















Let y denote the solution for Cˆ = 0 and z denote the solution for some Cˆ > 0. If Cˆ > 0, then we
have for all v ∈ (0, 1]:
z(v) = y(v)− Cˆe−
´ v
m g(x)dx < y(v).
Let vt be the cutoff path for Cˆ = 0 and wt be the cutoff path for Cˆ > 0. If we fix v0 = w0, then
z(v) < y(v) implies that for all t > 0, wt < vt. To see this, note that whenever vt = wt 6= 0, we have
w˙t = z(wt) < y(vt) = v˙t. Hence, at every point where the two cutoff paths coincide, wt must cross
vt from above. But since w0 = v0, this cannot happen (except at t = 0). As a result, wt cannot be
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part of the optimal solution.27 Therefore, the optimal solution is given by Cˆ = 0.
Now we are ready to prove part (i) of Theorem 2.
Proof of Part (i) of Theorem 2. Part (ii) of Lemma 15 shows that, if κ > −1, then there exists
a feasible solution to the auxiliary problem that differs from the efficient auction. The result,
together with Proposition 3, implies that the efficient auction is not optimal if κ > −1. If φ > −1,
the condition κ > −1 is equivalent to
(1 + φ)2 (n− 1)− ((n− 1)φ+ n− 2) (nφ+ n+ 1) > 0.
By collecting terms with respect to n, we can change the condition into
− (φ+ 1)2 n2 + 2 (φ+ 1)2 n− (φ2 + φ− 1) > 0,
or equivalently





This proves part (i) of the Theorem.
A.3.3 Step 3: Prove Optimality of the Constructed Solution
To prove part (ii) of Theorem 2, we first observe that v(1 − F (v)) is always locally concave when




It follows from Remark 1 that v(1 − F (v)) is locally concave for v sufficiently close to zero. Now
it suffices to show the following key result which is proved in Lemmas 19 and 20: the payoff floor
must be binding at the optimal solution whenever v(1−F (v)) is concave. This is sufficient for part
(ii) of Theorem 2, because the requirement that the optimal solution must have a binding payoff
floor constraint if vt is small, together with the impossibility of such a solution if n > N(F ) implied
by part (i) of Lemma 15, leaves only the efficient auction as an optimal solution.
The result that a concave monopoly profit implies a binding payoff floor constraint is also crucial
for proving Theorem 3. It implies that for the optimal solution, the payoff floor constraint can only
27If J(v0) < 0, then the cutoff path vt leads to later trading times for types with negative virtual valuation, hence
the sellers expected profit is higher. Next suppose that J(v0) > 0. Let x be defined by J(x) = 0. Let sv be the time
where vs = x and sw be the time where ws = x. Since wt < vt for all t, we must have sw < sv. Now we construct
a new feasible cutoff path that yields a higher expected profit than w. For the new path we set vˆ0 = v(sv−sw) and
˙ˆvt = v˙(sv−sw). Notice that vˆt < wt for t < sw, vˆt > wt for t > sw, and vˆsw = wsw = x. Hence, with the new cutoff
paths, all types with J(v) > 0 trade (weakly) earlier and all types with J(v) < 0 trade (strictly) later that with the
old cutoff path. Therefore the expected revenue of the seller is strictly higher.
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be slack on intervals where v(1−F (v)) is non-concave. If we impose Assumption A4 which requires
global concavity, then the solution constructed in Lemma 15 (with an appropriately chosen starting
cutoff v+0 ) is optimal if n < N(F ), which shows Theorem 3.
To prove this key result, it suffices to show that feasible solutions for which the payoff floor
constraint is slack for a time interval (a, b) are never optimal if v(1 − F (v)) is concave on the
interval of valuations [vb, va] that trade between a and b. Specifically, suppose we have a feasible
solution T with corresponding cutoff path vt for which the payoff floor constraint is strictly slack for
all t ∈ (a, b) where 0 ≤ a < b. We want to construct a new feasible solution Tˆ with corresponding
cutoff path vˆt that is also feasible and improves the seller’s expected profit. Our construction will
only change the trading times of the valuations in the interval (v+b − ε, va) where ε > 0 can be
arbitrarily small. This implies that the new solution satisfies the payoff floor constraint for all t
for which vˆt < v
+
b − ε because the continuation is unchanged for such t. For times t such that
vˆt ∈ (v+b − ε, va), we exploit that the payoff floor constraint was slack before the modification.
This implies that a small variation in trading times will not lead to a violation of the payoff floor
constraint by the new solution. Depending on whether types trade in the interior of the slack
interval or types trade only at the end of the interval, the constructed variations are different and
are covered in Lemmas 19 and 20, respectively. Finally, we exploit the following lemma to show
that the payoff floor constraint for t < a remains satisfied.
Lemma 16. Let T and Tˆ be non-increasing solutions with corresponding cutoff paths vt and vˆt
such that vt = vˆt for t ≤ a. Suppose T is feasible and that the slack in the payoff floor constraint
at a is the same for T and Tˆ . If the ex-ante revenue of the seller under Tˆ is greater than or equal
to the revenue under T , then Tˆ satisfies the payoff floor constraint for all t ≤ a.




e−r Tˆ (v) − e−r T (v)
)(
v − 1− F (v)
f(v)
)
nF (v)n−1f(v)dv > 0.
Using the assumption that vt = vˆt for all t ≤ a and hence T (v) = Tˆ (v) for all v > va, we can




e−r Tˆ (v) − e−r T (v)
)(
v − 1− F (v)
f(v)
)
nF (v)n−1f(v)dv > 0. (A.14)




e−r Tˆ (v) − e−r T (v)
)(
v − F (va)− F (v)
f(v)
)
nF (v)n−1f(v)dv = 0. (A.15)
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nF (v)n−1f(v)dv > 0,




e−r Tˆ (v) − e−r T (v)
)(F (va)− F (vt)
f(v)
)
nF (v)n−1f(v)dv > 0.




e−r Tˆ (v) − e−r T (v)
)(
v − F (vt)− F (v)
f(v)
)
nF (v)n−1f(v)dv > 0.
But this means that the slack in the payoff floor constraint at t < a is strictly greater under Tˆ than
for T . Hence, the payoff floor constraint is fulfilled under Tˆ for all t < a.
In light of Lemma 16, we construct the new solution in such a way that the payoff floor constraint
at is a unchanged and ex-ante revenue is improved. The Lemma then shows that the payoff floor
constraint is fulfilled for all t ∈ [0, a] for the new solution.
Before we take this approach, we prove two observations that will be useful in the subsequent
proofs. First, concavity of the monopoly profit is equivalent to the monotonicity of J(v)f(v) or the
monotonicity of J(v|v ≤ x)f(v) for all x ∈ [0, 1], as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 17. Suppose v(1−F (v)) is strictly concave for on an interval [a, b] where a < b ≤ x. Then
(J (s|v ≤ x)) f (s) is strictly increasing in s on the interval [a, b].
Proof. Note that
J(s|v ≤ x)f(s) =
(






s− 1− F (s)
f (s)
)
f (s) + 1− F (x)
= J(s)f(s) + (1− F (x)).






(sf(s)− (1− F (s))) = − d
2
ds2
(s(1− F (s))) .
Second, we show that, whenever the payoff floor constraint is slack for an interval (a, b), the
types that trade within the interval must have positive virtual valuation evaluated at any point of
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the time interval. Otherwise, one can construct alternative feasible trading times that delay the
trade for types with negative virtual valuation and increase revenue.
Lemma 18. Let T be an optimal solution for which the payoff floor constraint is slack for all
t ∈ (a, b). Then Jt (v) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ (a, b] and v ∈ [vb+ , va]. If vt is continuous at a, Ja(v) ≥ 0 for
all v ∈ [vb+ , va].
Proof. Let us first assume that the payoff floor constraint is strictly slack for all t ∈ [a, b]. Suppose
by contradiction that Jt(v) < 0 for some t ∈ (a, b] and some v ∈ [vb+ , va]. Then Jt(v˜) < 0 for
some v˜ ∈ [vb+ , va] and all t ≤ a, since Jt(v) is non-decreasing in t. We claim that the following
modification is feasible and improves revenue for δ > 0 sufficiently small:
Tˆ (v) =
T (v), if v > v˜T (v) + δ, if v ≤ v˜ .
With the new trading times, the payoff floor constraint at t+δ for t ≥ T (v˜) is the same as the payoff
floor constraint for t at the original trading times. For t < a the RHS of the payoff floor constraint
is unchanged and the LHS is increased because we delay trade of types that have a negative virtual
valuation at t ≤ a. For a < t < T (v˜) + δ, we distinguish two cases. If the type v˜ is the only type
that trades at T (v˜) then for δ sufficiently small, the payoff floor constraint is fulfilled because it was
strictly slack for a ≤ t < T (v˜) before the change. If v˜ is part of an atom of types that all trade at
the same time, the same argument applies to the payoff floor constraint at t ∈ [a, T (v˜)]. After the
modification, however, the posterior at times t ∈ (T (v˜), T (v˜) + δ) is the prior truncated to [0, v˜].




e−r(T (v)−T (v˜)) − 1
) (
v − F (v˜)− F (v)
f(v)
)
f(v)n (F (v))n−1 dv > 0.
This implies that after the modification, the payoff floor constraint is strictly slack at T (v˜) + δ and
hence for δ sufficiently small it is also fulfilled for all t ∈ (T (v˜), T (v˜) + δ).
It remains to show the result for the case that the payoff floor constraint is binding at a and b
but strictly slack on (a, b). In this case, we know that the result holds true for t ∈ [a+ ε, b− ε] for
any ε > 0 and v ∈ [v+b−ε, va+ε]. Since v− F (vt)−F (v)f(v) is continuous in vt and v and there is no atom at
a or b, respectively if the payoff floor constraint binds, Jt(v) is continuous in (t, v) at the endpoints
of the interval if the payoff floor constraint is binding. By continuity, the result for [a + ε, b − ε]
extends to the endpoints.
Now we construct a feasible variation that improves revenue. We have to consider two scenarios.
In the first scenario, there is a time interval [s, s′] ⊂ (a, b) such that trade occurs with positive
probability between s and s′. In this case, there exists a variation of the trading times for those
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types who trade in the interval [s, s′]. Roughly speaking, we construct an alternative solution
by splitting the types trading in (s, s′), and then clustering them to the endpoints s and s′. In
particular, we advance the trading time of high types who previously traded in (s, s′) and delay
the trading times of low types who previously traded in (s, s′). The variation is constructed such
that the payoff floor constraint at s is unchanged. Furthermore, our concavity assumption ensures
that the alternative trading time Tˆ also leads to a higher ex ante revenue than T . It follows from
Lemma 16, that the payoff floor constraint is fulfilled for all t < s. Formally, we have the following
result.
Lemma 19. Let T be a feasible solution for which the payoff floor constraint is strictly slack for
all t ∈ (a, b). Suppose there is a positive measure of types v ∈ [vb, va] for which T (v) /∈ {a, b}. If
v(1− F (v)) is strictly concave for all v ∈ [vb, va], then T is not optimal.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that T is optimal. We consider a variation of the trading times on
small interval [s, s′′] ⊂ (a, b) constructed as follows. First we choose [s, s′′] such that vs′′ < vs and
there is a positive measure of types with trading times in (s, s′′) and such that there are no atoms
of trade at s or s′′. In words, we choose an interval of types that do not trade at the endpoints
of [s, s′′] (they could all trade in an atom). Next we pick some type w with s < T (w) < s′′ and
define Tˆ such that all types in [vs′′ , w] trade at s
′′ and all types in (w, vs] trade at s. Formally the
modification of the trading time can be written as
Tˆ (v) =

T (v) if v ≥ vs,
s if v ∈ (w, vs],
s′′ if v ∈ [vs′′ , w],
T (v) if v ≤ vs′′ .

















Note that if w = vs the first integral vanishes so that the LHS is negative, and if w = vs′′ , the
second integral vanishes and the LHS is positive. Since the LHS is continuous in w, we can choose
w such that (A.16) is satisfied. Note also that if we choose s and s′′ sufficiently close together, then
the payoff-floor constraint remains satisfied for all t ∈ [s, s′′] because it was strictly slack before the
variation. Also the payoff-floor constraint for t > s′′ is not affected by this change. Finally, if we
can show that the ex-ante revenue increases, Lemma 16 implies that the payoff floor constraint is
61











′′ − e−r T (v)
)
(J(v)f(v)) n(F (v))n−1dv > 0.




e−r s − e−r T (v)
)





′′ − e−r T (v)
)
(F (vs)− 1) n(F (v))n−1dv > 0,











′′ − e−r T (v)
)
n(F (v))n−1dv < 0.
Multiplying by Js(w)f(w) we have (by Lemma 18, Js(s





















































where the last equality follows from (A.16).
Lemma 19 implies that the probability of trade at times in the interior of the slack interval must
be zero. It leaves open the scenario in which the slack interval consists of a single “quiet period”
without trade in (a, b) followed by a single “atom” at b, formally, va = vb > v
+
b . In this case, we
construct an alternative trading scheme by splitting the atom so that the trading times of high types
in the atom are advanced, while the trading times of low types in the atom are delayed. The latter
requires that we also delay the trading time for types v ∈ [v+b −ε, v+b ] for some ε > 0. Otherwise the
new solution would violate monotonicity of the trading times. This modification can be constructed
in a way such that the slack in the payoff floor constraint at a remains unchanged and the payoff
floor constraint is satisfied on the newly created second quiet period. Again, concavity implies that
ex-ante revenue is increased by this variation which implies that the payoff floor constraint at t ≤ a
is still satisfied after the variation. Formally, we have the following result.
Lemma 20. Let T be a feasible solution for which the payoff floor constraint is strictly slack for
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all t ∈ (a, b] and binding for a and b+. Suppose T (v) = b for all v ∈ (v+b , va). If v(1 − F (v)) is
strictly concave for all v ∈ [vb+ − ε, vb] for some ε > 0, then T is not optimal.
Proof. The logic of the proof is similar to proof of Lemma 19. Again, suppose by contradiction
that T is optimal. We construct a variation by splitting the atom at some type w ∈ (vb+ , vb). First,
we let types [w, vb] trade at s < b. Second, we want to delay the trading times for types [vb+ , w) to
s′′ > b, where vs′′ ≥ vb+ − ε. In order to maintain monotonicity we also have to delay the trading
time of all types v ∈ [vs′′ , vb+). To summarize we have:
Tˆ (v) =

T (v) if v > vb,
s if v ∈ [w, vb],
s′′ if v ∈ (vs′′ , w),
T (v) if v ≤ vs′′ .






















′′ − e−r T (v)
)
(Ja(v)f(v)) n(F (v))
n−1dv = 0. (A.17)
We argue that it is feasible to choose such w, s, and s′′. First note that, if we set s′′ = b, vs′′ = v+b ,
and s < b, the left hand side of the equality is strictly positive since Ja(w) ≥ 0 by Lemma 18.
Next, we show that for s = b we can choose s′′ > b such that the left hand side of the expression is
strictly negative. If Ja(vb+)f(vb+) > 0, we can choose s
′′ such that Ja(vs′′)f(vs′′) ≥ 0. In this case
the last two integrals are strictly negative. If Ja(vb+)f(vb+) = 0 (“<” is ruled out by Lemma 18)
then Ja(v)f(v) < 0 for v < v
+

















































































n(F (v))n−1dv > 0.
Moreover, for every vs′′ < vb there is an sˆ with vsˆ ∈ (vs′′ , vb) such that there is no atom at sˆ.
Hence we can take vs′′ be a type that is not part of an atom. To summarize, we have shown that
for some (s, b) the payoff floor constraints at a decreases and for some (b, s′′) it increases. We can
select s′′ such that the last two integrals in (A.17) become arbitrary small. Since the first integral
is continuous in s we can find a value for s such that the whole expression is equal to zero. This
proves that our construction is possible.
If the payoff-floor constraint binds at a it must be slack for all t ∈ (a, s] since there is no trade
in this interval. Next we argue that the variation does not violate the payoff floor constraint for
t > s. If we choose both s and s′′ sufficiently close to b, then the payoff-floor constraint remains




e−r(T (v)−b) − 1
) (
v − F (w)− F (v)
f(v)
)
f(v)n (F (v))n−1 dv > 0.
Also the payoff-floor constraint for t > s′′ is not affected by this change. Finally, if we can show that
the ex-ante revenue increases, Lemma 16 implies that the payoff floor constraint is also satisfied for
t < s.
Ex-ante revenue increases if(
























′′ − e−r T (v)
)(
v − 1− F (v)
f(v)
)
f(v)n(F (v))n−1dv > 0.
By subtracting the condition (A.17) from the above inequality, we obtain:
(





























f(v)n(F (v))n−1dv > 0.
This can be rearranged to(















′′ − e−r T (v)
)
n(F (v))n−1dv < 0.
If we multiply the LHS by Ja(w)f(w), we get(














































where the last equality is the condition for the unchanged payoff floor constraint at a.
Finally, we want to use the fact that v(1− F (v)) is concave on an interval [0, v¯]. The following
Lemma shows that a feasible solution cannot end with an atom of trade.
Lemma 21. Let T be a feasible solution. Then for all t > 0 such that vt > 0, there exists w < vt
such that T (v) > t for all v ≤ w.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that for some t with vt > 0, we have T (v) = t for all v ∈ [0, vt].
































which is a contradiction because for ε sufficiently small, the RHS is strictly positive but the LHS
is non-positive.
Now we have all lemmas needed to complete the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3.
Proof of Part (ii) of Theorem 2. Since φ > −1, there exists a valuation v¯ > 0 such that for all
v ∈ [0, v¯], (f ′(v)v)/f(v) > −2 which implies that v(1−F (v)) is concave on this interval. Lemma 21
shows that the optimal solution does not end with an atom. Therefore, Lemmas 19 and 20 imply
that there exists a time t¯ with vt¯ ≤ v¯ after which the payoff floor must be binding for all t at the
optimal solution. Lemma 15 shows that this is not possible if n > N(F ). Proposition 3 and the
existence of an optimal solution (Proposition 1) therefore imply that the efficient auction is the
only element in the feasible set of the auxiliary problem if n > N(F ). This completes the proof of
part (i) of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 3. By Lemmas 19 and 20 and Assumption A4, the payoff floor constraint must
be binding at the optimal solution and by Lemma 15 the solution must satisfy (4.2).











A.4 Proofs for Section 5
To justify our auxiliary mechanism design approach, we need to show that the solution to our
auxiliary problem is the limit of a sequence of equilibria in discrete time games. Again, we give
a graphical overview (see Figure A.2) of the various lemmas that are used in Section 5 and this
Appendix to develop the discrete time approximation.
A.4.1 Construction of a Solution to the Generalized Payoff Floor Constraint
The key step of the approximation is to discretize the solution to the binding payoff floor constraint.
In order to do that, we first need to find a feasible solution such that the payoff floor constraint is
strictly slack. We use a change of variables y = v˙t to rewrite the ODE obtained in Lemma 12 as
y′(v) = −r − g(v,K)y(v)− h(v,K) (y(v))2 . (A.18)
Any solution to the above ODE with K > 1 would lead to a strictly slack payoff floor constraint.
Our goal is to show that the solution to the ODE exists and converges as K ↘ 1. For fixed K,
































































































































































































































































































































































































































continuous in y for all v ≥ 0. Unfortunately, although the RHS is locally Lipschitz continuous for
all v > 0, its Lipschitz continuity may fail at v = 0. Therefore, for v strictly away from 0, the
standard argument applies given Lipschitz continuity, but for neighborhood around 0, we need a
different argument. In what follows, we will center our analysis on the neighborhood of v = 0.
First, we show that the operator




is a contraction mapping. Next, we show that the fixed point of LK converges uniformly to the
fixed point of L1 as K ↘ 1. Finally, we show that we can obtain a sequence of solutions TK that
converge (pointwise) to the solution of the binding payoff floor constraint (with K = 1) and show
that the revenue of these solutions also converges to the value of the auxiliary problem.
Lemma 14 can be used to derive bounds for the RHS of (A.18). We treat the cases of κ ∈ (−1, 0]
and κ > 0 separately. Moreover, when κ > 0, we restrict attention to the case of κ ∈ (0, 1/r). Since
by Proposition 2 the solution to the auxiliary problem is invariant with respect to r, our analysis
for κ < 1/r carries over to the case of κ ≥ 1/r.




|g(v,K)|v + 2ξh(v,K)v2 < κˆ. (A.19)
(ii) Suppose κ ∈ (0, 1/r). Then there exists 0 < κ < κ < κ¯ < 1/r, Γ > 1, γ > 0, such that for all
K ∈ [1,Γ] and all v ∈ (0, γ],
κ < |g(v,K)|v + 2
κ¯










Proof. For part (i), first note that since κ ∈ (−1, 0], (A.7) implies the existence of κˆ ∈ (0, 1), Γ˜ > 1,




















Part (ii) can be proved analogously.
The next step is to define a space on which LK is a contraction mapping. For κ ∈ (−1, 0] we
use the space
Yξ := {y : [0, γ]→ R | y(v) ∈ [−ξv, ξv]} ,






For κ ∈ (0, 1/r) we use the space
Zκ¯ :=
{
y : [0, γ]→ R
∣∣∣∣ y(v) ∈ [−1κ¯v, 0]
}
,






Lemma 23. The spaces (Yξ, ‖·‖) and (Zκ¯, ‖·‖κ¯) are Banach spaces.
Proof. It is clear that ‖·‖ is a norm: (1) ‖y‖ ≥ 0, (2) ‖y‖ = 0 implies |y(v)|/v = 0 for all
v ∈ (0, γ] so y ≡ 0, and (3) ‖y + z‖ = supv∈(0,γ] |y(v) + z(v)|/v ≤ supv∈(0,γ](|y(v)| + |z(v)|)/v
= supv∈(0,γ] |y(v)|/v + |z(v)|/v ≤ supv∈(0,γ] |y(v)|/v + supv∈(0,γ] |z(v)|/v = ‖y‖ + ‖z‖. To see that
(Yξ, ‖·‖) is complete, note that it is isomorphic to the space {x : [0, γ]→ R |x(v) ∈ [−ξ, ξ]} with
the standard supremum norm (via the mapping x(s) = y(s)s). Since this space is complete, the
original space is also complete.
One can verify that ‖·‖κ¯ is a norm by the same argument as for ‖·‖. Next one can also show
that Zκ¯ equipped with the norm ‖·‖ is complete by the same argument as for (Yξ, ‖·‖). To show
the completeness of (Zκ¯, ‖·‖κ¯), let (ym) ∈ Zκ¯ be a ‖·‖κ¯-Cauchy sequence with limit y∗ : [0, γ]→ R.
Since 1/sκ¯+1 > 1/s for s ∈ (0, 1), ‖·‖κ¯ ≥ ‖·‖. Hence (ym) is also a ‖·‖-Cauchy sequence and
ym → y∗ (w.r.t. to ‖·‖). It follows from the completeness of (Zκ¯, ‖·‖) that y∗ ∈ Zκ¯. Therefore,
(Zκ¯, ‖·‖κ¯) is complete.
Now we are ready to show that LK is a contraction mapping.
Lemma 24. (i) Suppose κ ∈ (−1, 0]. If κˆ, Γ, γ, and ξ > r/(1− κˆ) satisfy (A.19), then LKYξ ⊂ Yξ
and LK is a contraction mapping on (Yξ, ‖·‖).
(ii) Suppose κ ∈ (0, 1/r). If 0 < κ < κ < κ¯ < 1/r, Γ > 1, and γ > 0, satisfy (A.20) and (A.21),
then LKZκ¯ ⊂ Zκ¯ and LK is a contraction mapping on (Zκ¯, ‖·‖κ¯).
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Proof. (i) We first show that LKYξ ⊂ Yξ. For all y ∈ Yξ we have
|(LKy)(v)| =












≤ rv + ξκˆv
≤ ξv,
where we have used y ∈ Yξ for the second inequality, (A.19) for the third inequality, and ξ > r/(1−κˆ)
for the last inequality. Next, suppose y, z ∈ Yξ. We have




















|g(s,K)| ‖z − y‖ s+ h(s,K) ‖z − y‖ s 2ξs ds






|g(s,K)| s+ 2ξh(s,K)s2 ds







= κˆ ‖z − y‖ .
For the first inequality, we have used that y, z ∈ Yξ and for the last inequality we have used (A.19).
Since κˆ ∈ (0, 1), LK is a contraction mapping on (Yξ, ‖·‖).
(ii) For z ∈ Zκ¯, we have








































Therefore, LKZκ¯ ⊂ Zκ¯. For y, z ∈ Zκ¯ we have


















































‖z − y‖ .
Therefore, LK is a contraction mapping on (Zκ¯, ‖·‖κ¯).





















Therefore, y ∈ Yξ if κ ∈ (−1, 0] and y ∈ Zκ¯ if κ ∈ (0, 1/r).
We also need to show that the fixed-point of LK is non-positive as required by the condition
v˙t ≤ 0. For κ ∈ (0, 1/r), this follows immediately since y ∈ Zκ¯ implies y(v) ≤ 0. For the other case,
we have the following lemma.
Lemma 25. If κ ∈ (−1, 0], then the fixed-point of LK satisfies y(v) < 0 for all v ≤ γ.
Proof. We use the Picard-Lindelof iteration starting with the constant function y0(v) = 0. We need
to distinguish two subcases:
(i) κ < 0. Since κ = limv→0 vg (v) and g (v) = limK→1 g (v,K), there exist γ > 0,Γ > 1 such
that g(v,K) < 0 for all v ∈ (0, γ] and K ∈ [1,Γ]. We argue by induction that LmK0 < 0 for all n.
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For m = 1 we have (L1K0)(v) = −rv < 0. For n > 1 we have
(LmK0)(v) = −rv −
ˆ v
0









where the first inequality follows from that fact that h > 0, and the second inequality follows from
the induction assumption (Lm−1K 0)(s) ≤ 0 and the fact that g(s,K) < 0. Therefore, the fixed point
on Yξ must be negative.
(ii) κ = 0. In this case, g(v,K)v → 0 as K ↘ 1. Therefore, for all ε > 0, there exist γ > 0,Γ > 1
such that for all v ∈ (0, γ] and K ∈ [1,Γ],
g(v,K)v ± 1
1− εh(v,K)v
2 ∈ [−ε, ε].
Fix ε < 1/2. We now show inductively that −1−εm1−ε rv ≤ (LmK0)(v) ≤ 0. This is clearly true for
n = 1. For m > 1, we have
(Lm+1K 0)(v) = −rv −
ˆ v
0







































where the first inequality follows from (LmK0)(v) ≤ 0 and the third inequality follows from induction
assumption for n. Moreover,
(Lm+1K 0)(v) = −rv −
ˆ v
0



















where the last inequality holds for ε < 1/2. Therefore, −1−εm+11−ε rv ≤ (Lm+1K 0)(v) < 0. Hence, as in
the previous two cases, the fixed point on Yξ must be negative.
Let yK be the fixed point of LK . Next we show that the fixed-point yK is continuous in K.
Lemma 26. (i) Suppose κ ∈ (−1, 0]. For any ε > 0, there exists Γ > 1 and γ > 0 such that
‖LKy − L1y‖ < ε for all K ∈ [1,Γ], v ∈ (0, γ] and all y ∈ Yξ.
(i) Suppose κ ∈ (0, 1/r). For any ε > 0, there exists Γ > 1 and γ > 0 such that ‖LKy − L1y‖ < ε
for all K ∈ [1,Γ], v ∈ (0, γ] and all y ∈ Zκ¯.
Proof. (i) By Lemma 22, for any ε > 0, there exists Γ > 1 such that
sup
v∈(0,γ]
|g(v,K)v − g(v, 1)v| < ε





∣∣h(v,K)v2 − h(v, 1)v2∣∣ < ε
ξ (1 + ξ)
,
for all K ∈ [1,Γ]. Then, for any y ∈ Yξ,
‖LKy − L1y‖ = sup
v∈(0,γ]
∣∣´ v






0 (g(s,K)− g(s, 1)) ‖y‖ sds








ξ (1 + ξ)
‖y‖ (1 + ‖y‖)
≤ ε.
This proves part (i). The proof for (ii) is similar.
Therefore, yK = limn→∞ (LK)m y for any y in (Yξ, ‖·‖). That is, for any fixed ε > 0, for any
y ∈ Yξ, there exists Γ > 1 such that, for all K ∈ [1,Γ], ‖(LK)m y − yK‖ < ε for sufficiently large m.
This result is then used to show yK(v)→ y1(v) uniformly in the neighborhood of v = 0 as K → 1.
Lemma 27. There exist γ > 0 such that supv∈(0,γ] (yK(v)− y1(v))→ 0 as K → 1.
Proof. Again we distinguish two cases. Consider first the case of κ ∈ (−1, 0]. In this case, it suffices
to show that ‖yK − y1‖ → 0 since convergence in the norm ‖·‖ implies uniform convergence. The
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proof here is taken from Lee and Liu (2013, Lemma 13(b)). For completeness, we replicate it here.
Fix any K ∈ [1,Γ], where Γ is given by Lemma 26. For any m > 1,
‖(LK)m y − (L1)m y‖ =
∥∥∥(LK)m y − L1 (LK)m−1 y + L1 (LK)m−1 y − (L1)m y∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥LK (LK)m−1 y − L1 (LK)m−1 y + L1 (LK)m−1 y − L1 (L1)m−1 y∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥LK (LK)m−1 y − L1 (LK)m−1 y∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥L1 (LK)m−1 y − L1 (L1)m−1 y∥∥∥
≤ ε+ λ
∥∥∥(LK)m−1 y − (L1)m−1 y∥∥∥ ,
where λ < 1 is the Lipschitz constant of the contraction mapping L1 and the last inequality follows
from Lemma 26. Inductively, for any m > 1,
‖(LK)m y − (L1)m y‖ ≤ ε+ λ
∥∥∥(LK)m−1 y − (L1)m−1 y∥∥∥
≤ ε+ λε+ λ2ε+ · · ·+ λm−1 ‖LKy − L1y‖
≤ ε+ λε+ λ2ε+ · · ·+ λm−1ε
≤ ε
1− λ,
where the last inequality again follows from Lemma 26. Then
‖yK − y1‖ = ‖yK − (LK)m y + (LK)m y − (L1)m y + (L1)m y − y1‖
≤ ‖yK − (LK)m y‖+ ‖(LK)m y − (L1)m y‖+ ‖(L1)m y − y1‖
≤ ‖yK − (LK)m y‖+ ‖(LK)m y − (L1)m y‖+ ‖(L1)m y − y1‖
≤ ε+ ε
1− λ + ε
≤ ε3− 2λ
1− λ .
Therefore, ‖yK − y1‖ → 0 as K → 1. The same proof applies to the case of κ ∈ (0, 1/r).
Now we have all the ingredients necessary to prove Lemma 8.
Proof of Lemma 8. The uniform convergence of yK implies that the cutoff sequence v
K
t given by
v (t) = v (0) +
´ t
0 yK (v (s)) ds converges pointwise to the cutoff sequence vt = v
1
t associated with
the trading time function T (v) = T 1 (v). Since vt is continuous and strictly decreasing (be Lemma
13), this implies that the trading time function
TK (v) = sup
{
t : vKt ≥ v
}
converges pointwise to T (v). To see this, note that sup {t : vt ≥ v} = sup {t : vt > v}, since vt is
continuous and strictly decreasing. Now, for all t such that vt > v, there exists K
t such that vKt > v
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t : vKt ≥ v
} ≥ sup {t : vt > v} .
Similarly, for all t such that vt < v, there exists K






t : vKt ≥ v
} ≤ sup {t : vt ≥ v} .





t : vKt ≥ v
}




TK(v) = T (v).
It remains to show that the seller’s ex ante revenue converges. Notice that the sequence e−rTK(v)















∣∣∣J(v|v ≤ vK,∆t ) ≥ 0} .
Consider the LHS of the payoff floor constraint at t = k∆, k ∈ N0. Notice that, for k > 0, the
new posterior at this point in time is equal to the old posterior at ((k − 1)∆)+. Therefore, we can


























































K(v)−(k−1)∆) (1− er∆) J(v|v ≤ vK,∆k∆ ) f (n)(v|v ≤ vK,∆k∆ )dv.
The first term in the last expression is equal to the LHS of the payoff floor constraints at ((k−1)∆)+




K,∆(v)−k∆)J(v|v ≤ vK,∆k∆ ) f (n)(v|v ≤ vK,∆k∆ )dv
=KΠE(vK,∆k∆ ) +
(
er∆ − 1) ˆ v˜K,∆k∆
0
e−r (T
K(v)−(k−1)∆)J(v|v ≤ vK,∆k∆ ) f (n)(v|v ≤ vK,∆k∆ )dv
≥KΠE(vK,∆k∆ ) +
(
er∆ − 1) ˆ v˜K,∆k∆
0
J(v|v ≤ vK,∆k∆ ) f (n)(v|v ≤ vK,∆k∆ )dv
=KΠE(vK,∆k∆ )−
(
er∆ − 1) [ΠM (vK,∆k∆ )−ΠE(vK,∆k∆ )]
=KΠE(vK,∆k∆ )−
(





Next we show that
ΠM (vK,∆k∆ )
ΠE(vK,∆k∆ )
− 1 is uniformly bounded. Recall that by Assumption A4, there
exist 0 < M ≤ 1 ≤ L <∞ and α > 0 such that Mvα ≤ F (v) ≤ Lvα for all v ∈ [0, 1]. This implies













Next, we observe that the revenue of the efficient auction can be written in terms of the rescaled
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(n−1:n)(s)ds, then given F˜x(v) ≤ LM vα we can




− 1 ≤ 1
B
− 1.
Therefore, LHS of the payoff floor at t = k∆ is bounded below by[





Clearly, for ∆ sufficiently small, the term in the square bracket is greater than or equal to (K +
1)/2.




















The last inequality holds if ∆ is sufficiently small and Assumption A3 is satisfied. Hence Π∆(p, b) ≤
V (∆) ≤ Vε(0) for all (p, b) ∈ E(∆) if ∆ < ∆ε.
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B Existence of Weak Markov Equilibria and the Uniform Coase
Conjecture
The proofs of Propositions 5 and 7 are very similar to the proofs in Ausubel and Deneckere (1989)
(henceforth AD). Therefore, we adopt their notation and assume that the types of the bidders are
i.i.d. draws from U [0, 1]. We denote the type of buyer i by qi. The valuation for each type is given
by the function v(q) := F−1(q). Note that A3 implies that the same condition also holds for v. In
the following we will relax A1 and assume only that F is continuous and strictly increasing (as in
AD we could relax this even further to general distribution functions but this is not necessary for
the purpose of the present paper).28 In the following subsection, we only state proofs for the parts
of the proof of AD that need to be modified for the case of n ≥ 2.
B.1 Proof of Proposition 5
In a weak-Markov equilibrium, the buyers’ strategy can be described by a function P : [0, 1]→ [0, 1].
A bidder with type qi places a valid bid if and only if the announced reserve price is smaller than
P (qi). Given that v is strictly increasing, Lemma 1 implies that P is non-decreasing.
Also by Lemma 1, the posterior of the seller at any history is described by the supremum of
the support, which we denote by q. If all buyers play according to P , the seller’s (unconditional)
continuation profit for given q is29






nzn−1 − (n− 1)zn]+ P (y)n (q − y)yn−1 + e−r∆R(y) (B.1)
Let Y (q) be the argmax correspondence and define y(q) := supY (q). Because the objective
satisfies a single-crossing property, Y (q) is increasing and hence single-valued almost everywhere.
If Y (q) is single-valued at q the seller announces a reserve price S(q) = P (y(q)) if the posterior has
upper bound q.
The buyers’ indifference condition for the case that Y (q) is single-valued so that the seller does
not randomize, is given by:












28In AD the valuation is decreasing in the type. We define v to be increasing so that higher types have higher
valuations.
29Dividing the RHS by qn and replacing R(y) by ynR(y) would yield the conditional continuation profit. The
unconditional version is more convenient for the subsequent development.
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If the seller randomizes over Y (q) according to some probability measure µ, then


















which may require that µ depends on P (q).30
We will be looking for left-continuous functions R and P such that (B.1) and (B.2) are satisfied.31
If this is true for all q ∈ [0, q¯], then we say that (P,R) support a weak-Markov equilibrium on [0, q¯].
The goal is to show the existence of a pair (P,R) that supports a weak-Markov equilibrium on
[0, 1]. As in AD, we can show that the seller’s continuation profit is Lipschitz-continuous in q.
Lemma 28 (cf. Lemma A.2 in AD). If (P,R) supports a weak-Markov equilibrium on [0, q¯], then
R is increasing and Lipschitz continuous satisfying
0 < R(q1)−R(q2) ≤ n(q1 − q2)
for all 0 ≤ q2 < q1 ≤ q¯.


















nzn−1 − (n− 1)zn]+ P (y(q2))n (q2 − y(q2))(y(q2))n−1 + e−r∆R(y(q2))
= R(q2)
To show Lipschitz continuity, notice that the revenue from sales to types below q2 in the continuation
starting from q1 is at most R(q2) and the revenue from types between q2 and q1 is bounded above
by P (q1)(q
n
1 − qn2 ).32 Hence
R(q1)−R(q2) ≤ P (q1)(qn1 − qn2 )
≤ (qn1 − qn2 )
≤ n(q1 − q2)
30In the following, we give details for the case that the seller does not randomize and refer to AD for the discussion
of randomization by the seller.
31Left-continuity will be used in the proof of Proposition 7 in the next section.
32Suppose by contradiction that for the posterior [0, q1], the expected payment that the seller can extract from
some type q ∈ [q2, q1] is greater or equal than P (q1). In order to arrive at a history where the posterior is [0, q1], the
seller must have used reserve price P (q1) in the previous period. But then all types in [q, q1] would prefer to bid in
the previous period because they expect to make higher payments if they wait. This is a contradiction.
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Using this Lemma, we can show that an existence result for [0, q¯] can be extended to the whole
interval [0, 1].
Lemma 29 (cf. Lemma A.3 in AD). Suppose (Pq¯, Rq¯) supports a weak-Markov equilibrium on [0, q¯],
then there exists (P,R) which supports a weak-Markov equilibrium on [0, 1].








nzn−1 − (n− 1)zn]+ Pq¯(y)n (q − y)yn−1 + e−r∆Rq¯(y)
with yq¯′(q) as the supremum of the argmax correspondence. Moreover, we define Pq¯′(q) by


















q¯n + (1− e−r∆)Rq¯(q¯)
}
, the constraint in the maximization in the definition of







nzn−1 − (n− 1)zn]+ Pq¯′(q)n (q − y)yn−1 + e−r∆Rq¯′(y)





nzn−1 − (n− 1)zn]+ Pq¯′(q)n (q − y)yn−1 + e−r∆Rq¯′(y)
≤qn − yn + e−r∆Rq¯′(q)
≤(1− e−r∆)Rq¯(q¯) + e−r∆Rq¯′(q)
≤(1− e−r∆)Rq¯′(q) + e−r∆Rq¯′(q)
≤Rq¯′(q).
In the first step, we have used that the payments v(z) and Pq¯′(q) are less than or equal to one. In the




q¯n + (1− e−r∆)Rq¯(q¯)
}
; since q¯ ≤ y ≤ q ≤ q¯′, this
implies qn − yn ≤ (1− e−r∆)Rq¯(q¯). The third step uses Rq¯(q¯) = Rq¯′(q¯) and that Rq¯′ is increasing.
Thus (Pq¯′ , Rq¯′) supports a weak-Markov equilibrium on [0, q¯
′]. Since Rq¯(q¯) > 0, a finite number of
repetitions suffices to extend (Pq¯, Rq¯) to the entire interval [0, 1].
To complete the proof, AD replace the lower tail distribution on the interval [0, q¯] by a uniform
distribution. For the uniform distribution, a weak-Markov equilibrium can be constructed explicitly.
In the auction case, this has been shown by McAfee and Vincent (1997). Therefore, Lemma 29
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implies that for the modified distribution with a uniform part at the lower end, a weak-Markov
equilibrium exists. The final step is to show that the functions (P,R) that support the equilibrium
for the modified distribution converge to functions that support a weak-Markov equilibrium for the
original distribution as q¯ → 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. As in AD, we consider a sequence of valuation functions
vη(q) =









This corresponds to the original distribution except that on the interval [0, 1/η], we have made the
distribution uniform. McAfee and Vincent (1997) show that there exist (P˜1/η, R˜1/η) that support
a weak-Markov equilibrium on [0, 1/η]. Hence, by Lemma 29, for each η = 1, 2, . . ., there exists a
pair (Pη, Rη) that supports a weak-Markov equilibrium on [0, 1]. As in AD, we can assume that
Pη converges point-wise for all rationals to some function Φ(s), s ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1] and taking left limits
we can extend this limit to a non-decreasing, left-continuous function P : [0, 1] → [0, 1]. Also,
by Lemma 28, after taking a sub-sequence, we may assume that (Rn) converges uniformly to a
continuous function R. We have to show that (P,R) supports a weak-Markov equilibrium for v.
But given Lemma 28 and 29, only minor modifications are needed to apply the proof of Theorem
4.2 from AD.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 6
We want to show that the profit of the seller in any weak-Markov equilibrium of a subgame that
starts with the posterior [0, q], converges (uniformly over q) to ΠE(q) as ∆→ 0. The proof consists
of two main steps. The first step shows that for any type ξ ∈ [0, 1], any ∆ > 0, and any weak-Markov
equilibrium supported by some pair (P,R), the expected payment that the seller can extract from
type ξ is bounded by ξn−1P (ξ). We prove this by showing that the expected payment conditional
on winning is bounded by P (ξ).
Lemma 30. Let (P,R) support a weak-Markov equilibrium in the game for ∆ > 0. Suppose that in
this equilibrium, type ξ ∈ [0, 1] trades in period t, let the posterior in period t be qt ≥ ξ, and denote

















P (x) dxn, ∀q ∈ (0, 1].
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Proof. For q+t = ξ the RHS of the first inequality becomes P (q
+
t ) = P (ξ). Hence it suffices to show
that ˆ ξ
q
v(x)dxn−1 + qn−1P (q)
is increasing in q. For q > qˆ we have
ˆ ξ
q
v(x)dxn−1 + qn−1P (q)−
ˆ ξ
qˆ
v(x)dxn−1 − qˆn−1P (qˆ)




Using (B.2), we have
qn−1P (q)− qˆn−1P (qˆ)
=
(
1− e−r∆) qn−1v(q) + e−r∆ ˆ q
y(q)
v(x)dxn−1 + e−r∆ (y(q))n−1 P (y(q))
− (1− e−r∆) qˆn−1v(qˆ)− e−r∆ ˆ qˆ
y(qˆ)
v(x)dxn−1 − e−r∆ (y(qˆ))n−1 P (y(qˆ))
=
(















1− e−r∆) (qn−1v(q)− qˆn−1v(qˆ))+ e−r∆ ((y(q))n−1 P (y(q))− (y(qˆ))n−1 P (y(qˆ)))















1− e−r∆) ˆ q
qˆ
v′(x)xn−1dx
Proceeding inductively, we get








1− e−r∆) ˆ yk(q)
yk(qˆ)
v′(x)xn−1dx > 0,
where yk(·) denotes the function obtained by applying y(·) k times. This shows the first inequality.
For the second inequality, notice that the first inequality implies that the seller’s profit if the
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where T (x) denotes the trading time of type x in the weak-Markov equilibrium. This implies the
second inequality.
For the second step, fix the distribution and the corresponding function v and define vx : [0, 1]→





Using Helly’s selection theorem, we can extend this definition to x = 0, by taking the a.e.-limit of
a subsequence of functions vx. Denote by EwM (∆, x) the weak-Markov equilibria of the game with
discount factor ∆ and distribution given by vx where x → 0. Slightly abusing notation we write
(P,R) ∈ EwM (∆, x) for a weak-Markov equilibrium that is supported by functions (P,R). We show
that there is an upper bound for P (1) that converges to the expected payment in a second price
auction without reserve price as ∆→ 0, and the convergence is uniform over x.
Lemma 31. Fix v(·). For all ε > 0, there exists ∆ε > 0 such that for all ∆ ≤ ∆ε, all x ∈ [0, 1],






Proof. Suppose not. Then there exist sequences ∆m → 0 and xm → x¯ such that for all m ∈ N,






By a similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 4.2 of AD, we can construct a limiting
pair (P ,R), where P is left-continuous and non-decreasing, Pm converges point-wise to P for all























where we have used (B.4) to show the second inequality. Hence, we have
Rm(1)→ R(1) ≥ ΠE(1) + (1− q¯)ε
2
. (B.5)
But this implies that there must exist a type qˆ > 0, a time t > 0, and m¯ such that for all m > m¯,
Tm(qˆ) ≥ t.
where Tm(·) is the trading time function in the weak-Markov equilibrium supported by (Pm, Rm).
To see this, note that delay for low types is needed to increase the seller’s revenue beyond the
revenue from an efficient auction.
With this observation, we can conclude the proof using a similar argument as in Case I of
the proof of Theorem 5.4 in AD. From Lemma 30 we know that the maximal expected payment











P (z)dzn + e−rtR(qˆ). (B.6)





Combining (B.6) and (B.7) we get
ˆ qˆ
0






since t > 0. But Lemma 30 implies the opposite inequality which is a contradiction.
Using this Lemma, we can show that for a given v(·), the difference between the continuation
profit at [0, q] and ΠE(q), divided by v(q) converges uniformly to zero.
Lemma 32. Fix v(·). For all ε > 0, there exists ∆ε > 0 such that for all ∆ ≤ ∆ε, all x ∈ [0, 1],





Proof. The statement of the Lemma is equivalent to the statement that for all ε > 0, there exists
∆ε > 0 such that for all ∆ ≤ ∆ε, all x ∈ [0, 1], and all (P,R) ∈ EwM (∆, x),
R(1|vx)−ΠE(1|vx) ≤ ε. (B.8)






To show (B.8), we combine Lemmas 30 and 31, and use that P (z|vx) = vx(z)P (1|vz·x) to get for









































= ΠE(1|vx) + ε
This allows us to complete the proof of Proposition 6.
Proof of Proposition 6. Translated into the notation of the main paper, Lemma 32 implies that for
a given distribution function F , for all ε˜ > 0, there exists ∆ε˜ > 0 such that for all ∆ ≤ ∆ε˜, all
v ∈ [0, 1], and all weak-Markov equilibria (p, b) ∈ EwM (∆), we have
Π∆(p, b|v) ≤ ΠE(v) + ε˜v.
As in the proof of Lemma 9, we can show that under Assumption A3, there exits a constant
B > 0 such that ΠE(v) ≥ Bv for all v ∈ [0, 1]. If we chose ε˜ sufficiently small we have
ε˜ ≤ Bε,
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⇐⇒ ε˜v ≤ Bεv,
⇐⇒ ε˜v ≤ εΠE(v),
⇐⇒ ΠE(v) + ε˜v ≤ (1 + ε)ΠE(v).
This implies that
Π∆(p, b|v) ≤ (1 + ε)ΠE(v)
for all ∆ ≤ ∆ε := ∆ε˜ for ε˜ sufficiently small.
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